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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MYRA MARGIS, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. Appellate Case No. 20010783-CA 
BERT LIETZ, 
Defendant / Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
PLAINTIFF / APPELLEE (hereinafter "Plaintiff) submits the following as her 
brief in the above matter. 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the Order entered by the 
trial court on August 22,2001, (R. 467-471) in which the Court grants the Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike an Order of Dismissal submitted by Defendant Bert Lietz pro se on 
March 12, 2001, and signed by the trial court on March 14,2001 (R. 253-255). 
1 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, 
and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
The Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's 
Order entered on December 18, 2000, in which the trial court denied Defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 214-215). Defendant had one month from the date of that 
final order to file a notice of appeal; Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 
20, 2001 (R. 471), nine months after the Court entered its final Order denying 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves the appellate 
court with no jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of defendant / appellant's contentions. 
Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841(Utah 1980). 
In addition, the appellate court does not have authority to review the award of 
damages because that issue was never addressed or raised in the trial Court as part of the 
original 60(b) motion, but is raised for the first time on appeal. (R. 95-132). Katz v. 
Pierce. 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Myra Margis objects to Defendant Bert Lietz's Statement of Issues on appeal, 
because it misstates the standard of review as well as the issues which are properly before 
this court for review. 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. In its ruling of August 24,2001, did the trial court err in striking the "Order of 
Dismissal" entered on March 14, 2001? 
The question of whether trial court properly ordered that the "Order of Dismissal" 
be stricken under URCP 60(a) or (b) should be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of 
discretion. Bishop v. Gentec. Inc.. 2002 UT 36 ^  27,444 Utah Adv. Rep. 10; Lindsay v. 
Atkm, 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 1984). Utah R. Civ P. 60. 
Defendant Lietz limits his description of this issue to "whether the dismissal order 
was subject to correction as a clerical error," which he describes as "a question of law, to 
be reviewed for correctness." Appellant's Brief at 1. 
2. Was a timely notice of appeal filed with respect to Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment? 
This is a jurisdictional question before the Appellate Court, which the court may 
address at any time, and which is before the Appellate Court de novo. Peay v. Peay, 607 
3 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). This question is dispositive of Defendant's 2 nd issue on appeal, 
which is "Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz?" 
Appellant's Brief at 2. 
3. In the event the appellate court is able to find jurisdiction to review Lietz's 2nd 
issue on appeal, Plaintiff relies upon Defendant's statement of the issue, with the 
standard of review being abuse of discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following rules are applicable to the disposition of this appeal and are 
included in the addendum to this brief: Utah R. Civ P. 60; Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Utah R. 
App. P. 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Myra Margis believes that Defendant Lietz catalogues all of the filings 
which have been submitted in this case. Appellant's Brief at 2-13. Plaintiff will attempt 
to condense this to a cohesive narrative. 
Plaintiff Myra Margis filed a complaint against Defendant Bert Lietz on August 
15, 1994, alleging generally that Margis had borrowed $7,000 from Lietz, posting the 
contents of the Carousel Social Club as collateral, and, despite Margis honoring all her 
obligations under the promissory note, Lietz wrongfully seized all of the contents of the 
4 
club, preventing its continued operation and preventing its sale as an ongoing enterprise 
to prospective purchasers (R. 1-13). Counsel for Lietz filed an Answer to the Complaint 
(R. 20-28), and the court eventually scheduled a trial for July 8,1996, with a pretrial 
conference set for June 14,1996 (R. 49). 
At the pretrial conference of June 14, 1996, the parties reached an agreement as to 
how the case could be settled, with Lietz agreeing to pay Margis $750 and return all of 
the equipment and personal property taken from the Carousel Club which he had in his 
possession, and both parties agreeing to sign mutual releases of all claims and to have 
mutual restraining orders not to harass one another, with the return of property to 
Plaintiff to occur within 14 days. (T. 6/14/1996 at 3-9). Defendant Lietz did not comply 
with this settlement agreement (egregiously), so Plaintiff never signed or filed any 
release papers or filed any dismissal documents. The court was apprised of the failure of 
the settlement to be effectuated by a letter Margis (pro se) faxed to the trial court on 
November 9, 1997, criticizing her attorney and Lietz (R. 56-57). On January 5,1998, the 
Court set the matter for a hearing on April 30,1998, regarding the concerns raised by 
Margis' letter (R. 58). On January 7,1998, the hearing was moved by the Court to May 
7, 1998 (R. 59-63). On May 13,1998, the Court moved the hearing date to August 14, 
1998, after being notified that Lietz's counsel McPhee was on military duty and would 
5 
be unavailable until early July of 1998. (R. 64; 66). On May 13, 1998, the Court of its 
own initiative specifically ordered that "BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH 
AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THE CASE MUST BE PRESENT," at the 8/14/98 hearing, 
with the threat of sanctions for failure to comply (R. 66). Each of the Court's Notices of 
Hearing except for that for the 8/14/98, specifically noted that Non-appearance of 
counsel "will result in pleadings being stricken and a default entered" (R. 58, 59-63, 64, 
66, 79). The Court was further notified of Defendant Lietz's actions in failing to comply 
with the settlement agreement in Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt filed on July 31,1998 
(R. 72-74). On July 31,1998, Plaintiff, through counsel, also filed a Notice of intent and 
attempts to enter settlement negotiations, which indicated that Defendant's named 
counsel McPhee was still out of state and unavailable to attend a hearing until August 24, 
1998 (R. 75-76). Plaintiffs motion for contempt was never scheduled for hearing by the 
trial court (T. 8/14/1998, T. 8/21/1998). 
Plaintiff Myra Margis drove from California to personally attend the August 14, 
1998, hearing as ordered by the Court, and her counsel also attended the hearing (T. 
8/14/1998). While Defendant's counsel McPhee did not attend the hearing, neither did 
any substitute counsel, and, most significantly, neither did the Defendant Bert Lietz. (T. 
8/14/1998; R. 79). The Court awarded Plaintiff her travel costs and attorney fees for 
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attending the hearing, and the Court of its own initiative set another hearing for its next 
open date, August 21,1998 (T. 8/14/1998; R. 79). The court specifically ordered that 
"failure to appear by the defendant or an attorney for defendant (Mr. McPhie or partners) 
will result in the defendant pleadings being stricken and a judgment will enter for the 
plaintiff, " with the Plaintiff allowed to appear by telephone so that she wouldn't be 
forced to drive from California again (T. 8/14/1998; R. 79). The Court ordered service 
of notice of the hearing both by mail and fax, both by Plaintiffs attorney and by the 
Court, on Defendant's attorney McPhee (T. 8/14/1998; R. 79). The court refrained from 
entering judgment for the Plaintiff as a sanction on 8/14/1996 simply because the court 
was concerned that adequate notice of that particular sanction had not been provided to 
Defendant, and the Court wanted to be sure that sanctions against the Defendant for 
failure to appear would "stick," which was the Court's explanation for giving Defendant 
Lietz or counsel another opportunity to appear at another hearing (T. 8/14/1998). 
On August 21,1998, Plaintiffs Counsel appeared at the Court's scheduled 
hearing but neither Defendant Lietz appeared, nor did any counsel on his behalf. The 
Court found that notice had been delivered to Defendant's Counsel McPhee, both by the 
court and by Plaintiffs counsel. The Court ordered that Defendant's pleadings be 
stricken, and that judgment be entered against Defendant in the amount of $67,200 plus 
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attorney fees (T. 8/21/1998; R. 88). This was reduced to an Order and Judgment 
prepared by Plaintiffs counsel and signed by the Court on August 28, 1998 (R. 89-90). 
On September 2, 1998, counsel for Lietz filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
and Award of Attorney fees, submitting a memorandum and affidavit in support which 
explained counsel's inability to personally attend the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 
8/21/1998, but which provided no explanation as to the failure of Defendant Lietz to 
personally attend either of the hearings as specifically ordered by the Court, or why 
alternate counsel did not attend (R. 95-132). 
The Court did not rule on (and deny) Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
until October 27, 2000 (R. 201), in accordance with the court's order of 8/14/1998, that 
the case would not "proceed to trial or hearing" until Defendant Lietz paid Plaintiffs 
costs and attorney fees for appearing at that day's hearing when Defendant Lietz did not 
(R.79). 
In the interim, Counsel McPhee for Defendant filed two notices to submit 
concerning the Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 133; 189-93). Lietz was ordered to 
appear on two separate occasions in supplemental proceedings (R. 154-55; 183-84). 
Counsel Ziter appeared on behalf of Lietz, filed a motion for a hearing on the Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment, and withdrew from representing Lietz (R. 153; 151; 181). 
8 
Defendant Lietz pro se, although represented by both McPhee and Ziter at the time, filed 
a motion to dismiss the action for a defective summons and failure to comply with URCP 
3(a) and 4(c)(2) (R. 160-171), after which Ziter withdrew as Lietz's counsel. Counsel 
for Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's pro se motion to dismiss, and shortly 
afterward a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, at which time Defendant Lietz pro se withdrew 
the motion to dismiss (R. 175-79; 196-98; 199). Counsel for Plaintiff filed a request for 
a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 158), and Plaintiff Margis 
pro se wrote a letter to the court expressing her displeasure with Defendant Lietz and his 
counsel (R. 145-47). Defendant Lietz finally tendered the ordered sanctions of $980.00 
to the court at a supplemental proceeding on October 5,2000, along with $300.00 held 
towards the judgment against Lietz (R. 193). 
Shortly after Lietz paid the $980.00 in sanctions into the Court, on October 27, 
2000, the Court signed a minute entry denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment (R. 201). Both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant submitted proposed Orders 
and Objections to the countervailing proposed Orders, (R. 207-208; 209-210), and 
Counsel for Lietz objected to releasing to Plaintiff Margis the $1280.00 held by the 
Court (R. 211-13). 
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On December 18, 2000, the Court signed the Order submitted by Plaintiffs 
Counsel, which stated that the "Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of 
Attorney Fees came before this Court on the Defendant's second Notice to Submit on 
October 6, 2000. . . . The Court after having considered the motion and reviewing all the 
pleadings and the Court's file, the Court denies the motion. The previous Order and 
Award of Fees remains in place" (R. 214), which quoted the court's language of the 
minute entry (R. 201). The Court also signed another Order .Releasing Funds ordering 
that the $1280 held by the court be paid to Plaintiff, representing $980 in sanctions and 
$300 paid towards the Judgment (R. 223). 
The Court entered a final order specifically denying Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment on December 18, 2000 (R. 214-15), but Defendant did not file a notice 
of appeal until September 20, 2001 (R. 476). 
Despite the entry of the Court's Order on December 18, 2000, affirming the 
Judgment entered on August 28,1998, and denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment (R. 214-15), and the Order Releasing Funds of December 18, 2001 (R.223), on 
February 6,2001, counsel for Lietz filed a Notice to Submit a host of prior motions 
which were all clearly resolved or rendered moot by the Court's Orders: these included 
objections to both Orders which had been signed by the Court; a Motion to Strike 
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Plaintiffs response to Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment; and Plaintiffs 
motion to release funds (R. 227-243). The subject matter of all these motions and 
objections, all filed before December 18,2000, were all resolved by the Orders entered 
by the Court on December 18,2000 (R. 214-15; 223; 467-471). 
The Third District Court Clerk's log indicates that Defendant's Counsel's Notice 
to Submit of February 2,2001, was delivered to the Court for Decision on March 12, 
2001. On that same day Defendant Lietz, acting pro se, submitted an Order of Dismissal 
to the Court, which described the parties as having reached an accord and satisfaction on 
14 June 1996, that all elements of that agreement had been satisfied, and that the case 
should be dismissed with prejudice effective 14 June 1996 (R. 253-255). On March 14, 
2001, the court signed the Order of Dismissal prepared and submitted by the Defendant 
pro se two days earlier, on March 12,2001 (R. 253-255). On its face the Order of 
Dismissal appeared to contradict all of the rulings of the trial court for the previous three 
years. 
Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Garnishment for First Security Bank on April 10, 
2001, and subsequently another Writ of Garnishment for America First Credit Union on 
June 26, 2001 (R.345-363). On July 5,2001, counsel for Lietz moved to quash and 
recall the Writ of Garnishment for America First Credit Union, based on the dismissal 
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order signed March 14, 2001 (R. 363-371). Counsel for Plaintiff Margis filed a response 
to the Defendant's motion to quash on July 15, 2001 (R. 431-442), and Defendant 
requested an enlargement of time to file a reply on July 20, 2001 (R. 443-44). 
On July 15, 2001, Counsel for Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Order of 
Dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) or (b), with arguments for several alternative 
grounds, but primarily as a clerical error in that the Order of Dismissal rendered the 
previous Orders relating to the judgment entered against the Defendant unclear, as 
judgment was entered against the Defendant as sanctions for failing to comply with the 
settlement agreement and subsequent orders of the Court after 14 June 1996 (R. 372-
430). Defendant never opposed or filed any response to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Order, which the court subsequently granted (R. 470-71). 
Plaintiff filed a notice to submit of the Motion to Strike Order, and of Defendant's 
Motion to Quash, on August 3, 2001 (R. 445). Then on August 13, 2001, Defendant 
filed a reply to Plaintiffs response to Defendant's Motion to Quash (R. 448-454), and 
Defendant moved to strike all of Plaintiff s pleadings after October 10,2000 (R. 455-
456). On August 16, 2001, Defendant then filed his own notice to submit the 
Defendant's Motion to Strike, the Motion to Quash, and the Motion to Enlarge Time (R. 
461- 66). Defendant did not respond to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Order. 
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On August 22, 2001, the Court entered its "Court's Ruling," striking the Order of 
Dismissal signed on March 14, 2001 (R. 470-71). The Court described in detail its 
reasoning for striking the Order of Dismissal, as well as how it initially entered the 
Order of Dismissal. The Court does not specify whether it is ruling under URCP 60(a) 
or (b), but states two distinct reasons for striking the order of dismissal: 1, " The Court 
now determines that the Order of Dismissal does conflict with the prior Judgment and 
Order": 2. "In addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever reached an accord 
and satisfaction" (R. 470, emphasis in original). The Court noted the confusion created 
by Defendant Lietz filing pro se documents at the same time that he was represented by 
one and two separate attorneys (R. 468-69,471). The Court also described the history of 
the case, affirmed that all of Defendant's subsidiary motions and objections had been 
denied with the Orders of December 18 and 19,2000, and denied Defendant's Motion to 
Quash and Motion to Strike (R. 467-71). 
On September 20, 2001, Defendant Lietz, by counsel, filed a notice of appeal of 
the "Court's Ruling" of August 22, 2001. (R. 476). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant Lietz states that "there are no additional facts in the record to consider 
pertaining to this appeal, other than those stated in the Statement of the Case" 
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(Appellant's Brief at 13). Defendant Lietz fails to cite or provide transcripts of the 
hearings of August 14, 1998, and August 21,1998, when the Court made its findings of 
fact and ordered that judgment be entered against the Defendant Lietz. Defendant 
Lietz's failure to marshal the evidence concerning these two hearings are particularly 
problematic because of Defendant's allegations on appeal that Judgment was entered 
against Lietz because of out-of-court contempt (Appellant's Brief at 24-5, 36-7), when 
the transcripts of the 8/14/98 and 8/21/98 hearings (as well as the notice of the 8/14/1998 
hearing prepared by the Court on May 13,1998), demonstrate that the court's sanctions 
and entry of judgment against Defendant Lietz were for Lietz's (or counsel's) personal 
failure to appear before the Court, as specifically ordered by the Court. The facts not 
marshaled would indicate that the Court's sanctions and entry of Judgment against 
Defendant Lietz were for his failure to appear for the Court's duly noticed and scheduled 
hearings. 
Defendant Lietz also does not describe the allegations made to the Court by 
Plaintiff and by Plaintiffs counsel concerning Lietz's failure to comply with the initial 
settlement agreement, in which Lietz failed to sign an inventory of the items he had 
provided to Plaintiff, that Lietz ripped the settlement check from Plaintiffs attorney's 
hand and drove away, nearly knocking down Plaintiffs attorney Nathan Pace with his 
14 
truck. For the next two years Defendant refused to redeliver the check or participate in 
attempts to comply with the settlement agreement. (R. 56-57, 72-74, 145-47). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the Court to grant Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Order, concerning the Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, because the Motion to 
Strike Order was not opposed by Defendant. The accurate record of the Court should 
indicate that although a settlement agreement was reached on June 14,1996, the case was 
never dismissed (because of non-completion of the terms of the agreement), and 
judgment was eventually entered against defendant because of non-compliance with 
Orders by the Court to appear before the Court. 
The trial Court's accurate determination "that the Order of Dismissal does conflict 
with the prior Judgment and Order" (R. 470) indicates that the Court's ruling fell under 
URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP 
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. The Court's 
additional finding that "it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever reached an accord 
and satisfaction" (R. 470), also points to alternative grounds to strike the Order pursuant 
to URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP 
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. To address both 
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concerns, the Court struck the Order of Dismissal which had left the record of the case 
unclear, and clarified the record of the case in its "Court's Ruling" entered on August 22, 
2001 (R. 467-71). 
In appealing the Court's grant of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike Order, Defendant 
fails to marshal any evidence which supports the Trial Court's rulings, and fails to point 
out any fatal flaw in the Trial Court's reasoning, which would be the basis for finding an 
abuse of discretion. As such the burden of the appeal is not met and must be dismissed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's 
Order entered on December 18, 2000, in which the trial court denied Defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 214-215). Defendant devotes the balance of his appeal 
attempting to argue that "the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the Default 
Judgment" and discussing the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of 
Attorney Fees (Appellant's Brief at 23-32), which was filed by Defendant on September 
2, 1998, (R. 95-132) and specifically denied by the Trial Court in its Order entered on 
December 18,2000 (R. 214). Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 
3 and 4, failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves the appellate court with no 
jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of defendant / appellant's contentions. Peay v. Peav, 
607 P.2d841(Utah 1980). 
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In the event the appellate Court reaches the merits of the question of whether the 
trial Court erred in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz, the trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion, in that Defendant presents no argument or explanation for 
why Defendant Lietz did not personally appear at the court-ordered hearings, as ordered 
by the Court. 
Defendant also fails to marshal any of the evidence, or discuss the findings of the 
trial court at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998, concerning the court's orders of 
sanctions for Defendant Lietz to appear, regardless of the actions or ability of his named 
counsel to appear. Without marshaling the evidence or pointing out any fatal flaw in the 
Court's reasoning, the court's factual findings must be accepted as true. 
Defendant raises the issue of damages for the first time on appeal, so the issue is 
not properly before the Court of Appeals. Also concerning Defendant's discussion of the 
damages awarded, or the need for affidavits to support damages, Defendant does not 
marshal, present, or address any evidence of the testimony taken by the trial court from 
the Plaintiff at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998 concerning the propriety and 
sufficiency of the damages requested in the Complaint. 
Concerning the allegations of indirect contempt, the hearing of August 14, 1998, 
was ordered by the Court as a pretrial conference on May 13, 1998 (R.66). No contempt 
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was cited by the court as justification for its orders, and any contempt would have been 
in-court contempt for failure to appear. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 
1988). By any means, the Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
Judgment entered against Defendant, as the Court's specific purpose in setting an 
additional hearing on August 21, 1998, was to ensure that the Court's actions were 
proper and would not be amenable to attack on appeal. (T. 8/14/1998; T. 8/21/1998). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER, 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS UNOPPOSED. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the Court to grant Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Order, concerning the Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, because the Motion to 
Strike Order was not opposed by Defendant. Defendant did not file any response to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Order, and Plaintiffs motion was ruled on properly as the 
subject of a Notice to Submit (R. 445). The court found valid reasons to strike the Order 
of dismissal, and its discretion should not be disturbed. 
POINT 2 THE TRIAL COURT ACCURATELY DETERMINED THAT THE 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION 
UNDER URCP 60(a) and (b)(6). 
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The trial Court's accurate determination "that the Order of Dismissal does conflict 
with the prior Judgment and Order" (R. 470) indicates that the Court's ruling fell under 
URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP 
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. The Court's 
additional finding that "it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever reached an accord 
and satisfaction" (R. 470), also points to alternative grounds to strike the Order pursuant 
to URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, or under URCP 
60(b)(6) in order to clarify the Court's record regarding the judgment. To address both 
concerns, the Court struck the Order of Dismissal which had left the record of the case 
unclear, and clarified the record of the case in its "Court's Ruling" entered on August 22, 
2001 (R. 467-71). 
DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF MARCH 14,2001, COULD BE 
STRICKEN OR AMENDED IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE STATUS OF THE 
COURT'S ORDERS, AS "ANY OTHER REASON" PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(6) 
The Trial Court entered Judgment against the Defendant on August 28,1998, 
even though the parties had previously reached a settlement agreement. While the Third 
District Court Clerk's record still accurately reflected that a valid judgment had been 
entered against the Defendant, the presence of an Order of Dismissal in the record 
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effective two years prior to the Entry of Judgment created the possibility of confusion 
regarding the Court's orders. The Defendant filed a motion to quash a valid garnishment 
based on the Order of Dismissal. Because of confusion created, the trial Court had the 
authority to clarify the order under the authority of URCP 60(b)(6). 
"A Motion for 'Clarification of Judgment' is not specifically provided for in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the substance of the motion is to make clear a 
judgment that it is not already clear. If the clarity of the judgment is called into question 
because the opposing party is improperly applying the judgment, then implicit in the 
motion is a request to change the judgment to provide relief to a party harmed by the lack 
of clarity. Accordingly, we hold that in the case before us, appellees motion for 
clarification, in which appellants joined, was sufficient to invoke Rule 60(b)." Kunzler v. 
O'delL 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 855 P.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1993). 
"A court may grant relief under subsection [six] of Rule 60(b) for any reason other 
than the first [five] enumerated by the rule if relief is justified, and the motion is made 
within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons 
Co., Inc.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991). Kunzler v. O'dell. Plaintiff does not 
claim "(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;" as the basis of this 
60(b) motion because the Judgment entered against Defendant on August 28, 1998, was 
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correctly not affected by the Order of Dismissal. Two valid garnishments were issued by 
the Court subsequent to the Defendant's Order of Dismissal, one on April 10, 2001, and 
one on June 26, 2001. The motion was also not based on "(3) fraud." The 60(b)(6) 
motion was for the purpose of clarifying the Court's Record concerning the Order of 
Dismissal, so that it remained clear to Court personnel or other judges evaluating the 
validity of writs of garnishment that a valid Judgment has been entered and affirmed by 
this court (on December 18, 2000), despite the entry of dismissal at a prior date. 
For greatest clarity of the record, the Order of Dismissal was stricken, with a new 
Order prepared which clearly describes the record of this Case. The trial Court corrected 
the Order to reflect that despite the previous settlement agreement, a Judgment was 
subsequently entered against Defendant. 
Relief under URCP 60 (a) may be sought "at any time." Relief under URCP 60 
(b)(6) must be sought within "a reasonable time." The Court issued two valid 
garnishments since the entry of the Order of Dismissal. Defendant created an apparent 
need for clarification of the Order of Dismissal by filing a Motion to Quash the last Writ 
of Garnishment. The Motion to Strike was filed four months after the Order was signed, 
and less than one week after Plaintiff first received actual notice of the Order of 
Dismissal. No party was prejudiced in the passage of time from the signing of the Order 
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of Dismissal. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Order of dismissal under URCP 60(b)(6) 
was timely. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL PREPARED BY PLAINTIFF PRO SE INCORRECTLY STATED THAT 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE CASE, 
PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a), THE COURT STRUCK THE ORDER TO PREVENT 
THE APPEARANCE OF A MISTAKE IN THE RECORD 
URCP 60(a) provides that clerical errors in orders may be corrected at any time. 
A Clerical amendment to an order "is one which is intended to make the judgment speak 
the truth by showing what the judicial action really was . . . " Richards v. Siddoway. 24 
Utah 2d 314,471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970). A clerical error is not a "judicial error"; A 
clerical amendment cannot correct a judicial decision by "making [a judgment] express 
something which the court did not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the 
first instance." Richards. The trial Court found that the Defendant's Order of Dismissal 
did not accurately reflect the actual rulings of the Court, and as such was subject to 
being stricken or corrected. 
The Defendant's Order of Dismissal decreed that "the parties did reach an accord 
and satisfaction in this matter." The record of the hearing on June 14, 1996, indicates 
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that while the Court recognized that an agreement for settlement was reached (an 
accord), satisfaction of that agreement was never provided. The extensive proceedings 
following that hearing, and the Court's eventual entering of Judgment against the 
Defendant on August 28,1998, are the result of the Court's actual determination that the 
Defendant had not complied with or provided satisfaction to that settlement agreement 
and subsequent court orders. 
If a judge erroneously assumes that an order presented by a party and signed by 
the judge correctly reflects the judge's Judgment, that is a mistake of a perfunctory or 
clerical nature which the court can and properly should correct upon its own motion. 
Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196,299 P.2d 827 (1956). In this case the Court 
explicitly determined that the Order prepared by Plaintiff Pro Se and signed by the Court 
did not accurately reflect the Judgments entered in this case, so it was stricken by the 
Court (R. 470). 
Defendant's Order of Dismissal states that an accord and satisfaction was 
completed on June 14,1996. While an initial settlement agreement was reached in court, 
Satisfaction was never delivered. Defendant did not comply with the settlement 
agreement or with further court orders. As partial sanctions for Defendant's non-
compliance, Defendant's Answer was stricken and judgment was entered against him. 
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As sanctions for Defendant's non-compliance, the settlement agreement and the potential 
dismissal of the case was voided. While an order could be entered reflecting the court 
hearing of June 14, 1996, the Order of Dismissal does not clearly reflect the status of this 
case. The Order of the case should reflect that notwithstanding the settlement agreement, 
Judgment was entered against Plaintiff on August 28,1998. To correct the appearance 
of an oversight in the record, the Court properly struck the Defendant's Order of 
Dismissal and entered its own Order to reflect that Judgment was subsequently entered 
against Defendant. URCP 60(a) again provides that the Court may make this correction 
at any time of its own initiative. 
THE ORDER OF MARCH 14, 2001, WAS SIGNED AS A CLERICAL ERROR BY 
THE COURT, AND WAS VALIDLY STRICKEN PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a) 
Even though a valid Judgment remained in place against Defendant, the Order of 
Dismissal was signed as a mistake or clerical error by the Court. On February 2, 2001, 
Defendant's Counsel submitted a Notice to Submit encompassing seven different 
procedural motions, objections, and orders. Court records indicate that on March 12, 
2001, the Notice to Submit was delivered to Judge Lewis for ruling, on the same day that 
Defendant pro se filed a totally separate Order of Dismissal with the Court. Plaintiffs 
counsel never received a copy of this order or was given any opportunity to respond to 
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the order. On March 14, 2001, at most two days after being filed, that Order of 
Dismissal was signed by the Court, although it was never the subject of any Notice to 
Submit or other Motion before the court. 
URCP 60(a) allows that clerical mistakes in "orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight.. .may be corrected by the court at any time of 
its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders." As a clerical error or mistake, the signed Order of Dismissal could be stricken 
by the Court immediately. The trial Court did not specifically state whether it was 
striking the Order of Dismissal as a clerical error, but it had the authority to do so. 
POINT 3 DEFENDANT LIETZ FAILS TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE 
DEMONSTRATING THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN STRIKING 
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL. 
"As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on finding of fact, appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and demonstrate 'that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the 
findings.'" Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322,1328 (Utah App. 1993). Compliance with 
the marshaling step is mandatory, State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487,491 (Utah App.) affd, 
cert granted. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) ("Our insistence on compliance with the 
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marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over 
substance."), and the standard for compliance is high. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Ca , 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991). 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
Id. at 1315. 
Additionally, simply listing the evidence is not enough. Once the supporting 
evidence is listed with appropriate citation to the record, the appellant must also 
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings 
when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. 
Stewart v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134,138 (Utah App. 1992). To do this, appellant 
must point to a specific "fatal flaw" in the evidence upon which the trial court based its 
decision, and "convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City. 818 P.2d at 1315. See also Stewart. 
831 P.2d at 138 (after coming "close" to marshaling evidence, appellant fails to "draw 
this court's attention to any flaw in the evidence upon which the [administrative law 
judge] relied"). 
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If an appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court must 
assume that the findings are correct and supported by the evidence, e.g., Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1992). Appellate courts have shown no reluctance in 
affirming the findings of the trial court where appellant does not properly marshal the 
evidence. See Ong Int'l flJ.S.Al Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,457 (Utah 1993); 
Robb,863P.2datl328; West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313. 
Here, Defendant Lietz does not even attempt to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings. Appellant's Brief at 13. Nowhere in Defendant Lietz's 
argument does he address a single piece of evidence supporting the trial court's decision. 
Appellant's Brief at 14-32. Furthermore, Defendant Lietz never cites a single finding of 
fact or conclusion of law. Id. Instead, Defendant Lietz merely repeats the arguments he 
made to the trial court. Id. Essentially, Defendant Lietz treats this Court as if it were 
"simply a depository" into which it can "dump the burden of argument and research," 
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 491, which is exactly what the marshaling requirement was designed 
to prevent. IcL Accordingly, Plaintiff Margis respectfully submits that Defendant Lietz's 
failure to marshal the evidence compels this Court to affirm the trial court's Order 
Striking the Order of Dismissal. 
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In appealing the Court's grant of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike Order, Defendant 
fails to marshal any evidence which supports the Trial Court's rulings, and fails to point 
out any fatal flaw in the Trial Court's reasoning, which would be the basis for finding an 
abuse of discretion. As such the burden of the appeal is not met and must be dismissed. 
POINT 4 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
ENTERED ON DECEMBER 18, 2000, IN WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT. 
Defendant did not file any notice of appeal relating to the Order denying 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, signed on December 18,2000 (R. 214-215). 
The Final Order in this case was signed August 28, 1998, and Defendant Lietz did not 
file an appeal of that Judgment. Defendant devotes the balance of his appeal attempting 
to argue that "the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment" and 
discussing the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees 
(Appellant's Brief at 23-32), which was filed by Defendant on September 2,1998, (R. 
95-132) and specifically denied by the Trial Court in its Order entered on December 18, 
2000 (R. 214). Defendant did not appeal that specific and final order. 
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Although Defendant conceivably asked for reconsideration of the court's order, 
concerning a "motion to reconsider," the Utah Supreme Court is "unaware of any such 
motion under our rules" Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), citing Utah State 
Employees Credit Union v. Riding. 24 Utah 2d 211,469 P.2d 1 (1970). Although 
Defendant had one month from the date of that final order to file a notice of appeal, 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 20,2001 (R. 471), nine months after 
the Court entered its final Order denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
Defendant did not file any intervening motion which tolled the time for filing an appeal. 
"The Trial Court is not to be in a position of acting as a court of review of its own 
ruling," Peav. citing Drurv v. Lunceford. 18 Utah 2d 74,415 P.2d 662 (1966). Pursuant 
to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal leaves the appellate court with no jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of defendant 
/ appellant's contentions. Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
POINT 5 THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT, AS DEFENDANT 
AGAIN DOES NOT MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
DEFENDANT LIETZ'S FAILURE TO APPEAR 
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In the event the appellate Court reaches the merits of the question of whether the 
trial Court erred in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz, the trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion, in that Defendant presents no argument or explanation for 
why Defendant Lietz did not personally appear at the court-ordered hearings, as ordered 
by the Court. 
Defendant fails to marshal any of the evidence, or discuss the findings of the trial 
court at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998, concerning the court's orders of 
sanctions for Defendant Lietz to appear, regardless of the actions or ability of his named 
counsel to appear. Without marshaling the evidence or pointing out any fatal flaw in the 
Court's reasoning, the court's factual findings must be accepted as true. With the same 
argument previously made concerning the duty to marshal the evidence, Plaintiff Margis 
respectfully submits that Defendant Lietz's failure to marshal the evidence compels this 
Court to affirm the trial court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment. 
POINT 6 APPELLATE COURT CANNOT REVIEW THE AMOUNT OF THE 
AWARD OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT 
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND DEFENDANT AGAIN 
FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
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The appellate court does not have authority to review the award of damages 
because that issue was never addressed or raised in the trial Court as part of the original 
60(b) motion, but is raised for the first time on appeal. (R. 95-132). Katz v. Pierce. 41 
Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). Also concerning Defendant's discussion of 
the damages awarded, or the need for affidavits to support damages, Defendant does not 
marshal, present, or address any evidence of the testimony taken by the trial court from 
the Plaintiff at the hearings of 8/14/1998 and 8/21/1998 concerning the propriety and 
sufficiency of the damages requested in the Complaint. 
POINT 7 CONTEMPT WAS NEVER ORDERED OR ADDRESSED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
Concerning the allegations of indirect contempt, the hearing of August 14,1998, 
was ordered by the Court as a pretrial conference on May 13, 1998 (R.66). No contempt 
was cited by the court as justification for its orders, and any contempt would have been 




Defendant Lietz filed a timely notice of appeal solely as to one issue, the Motion 
to Strike Defendant's Order of Dismissal, and that motion was granted on several 
grounds by the Trial Court after being unopposed by Defendant. Defendant Lietz fails to 
marshal any evidence as to why it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to Strike 
the Order of Dismissal. 
The Appellate Court does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, because the final order regarding that 
motion was entered on December 18, 2000, nine months before a notice of appeal was 
filed in this case. Regardless Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence concerning 
the trial court's denial of that motion. 
Plaintiff Myra Margis respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to deny 
Defendant Lietz's Appeal and award her costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of ^T^^h^T , 2002. 
DAVID S. PACE 
NATHAN D. PACE 
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I delivered by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff / Appellee on ' day of 
tyjfi+faxm to: 
JEROLD D. MCPHEE 
320 SOUTH 300 EAST, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111-2537 
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant 
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ttiement of civil case, 6 AL.R.3d 1457. Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
S
 Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
n opposition to motion for new trial in civil appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
1
 7 A L R 3d 1000. Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
Quotient"verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc- Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
which they are written, 10 A.L.IUd 501. new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre- alone new trial granted on ground of inade-
mises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. quacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 875. 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial After-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ae-
AL.R.3d 1101. tion for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial Inattention of juror from sleepiness or other 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. cause as ground for reversal or new trial, 59 
Jurors voir dire denial or nondisclosure of A.L.R.5th 1. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- damages for personal injury to or death of 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
A.L.R.3d 126. Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
Amendment, after expiration of time for nl- modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. ages for personal injury or death in actions 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
civil case where jury has been waived or not USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. Fed. 189. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors tKerei!T*artsing from oversight or omission may be 
corrected bv the court a{, anytime of its owrj jpitifltive or on thejmotion of any 
party a'nrjjffier such notice, if any, as^th^ourt^rrjgrs. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 




 Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
gment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
a
 P*?or Judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
aDnl* +'°T ^ *S n o * o n 6 e r equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
judg-m n ; o r ^ a n5r other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
(1) (2) (Q e m o t * o n s ^ a ^ be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
Ws
 e V°r A n 0 t m ° r e ^ a n ^ m o n t ^ s a^ t e r the judgment, order, or proceeding 
finalityf ° r t a k e n - Amotion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
Power of a ^ u d g m e n t o r suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
judgme^ C °? r t t o e n t e r t a i n an independent action to relieve a party from a 
c
°urt. Th' e r ° r p r o c e e ^ n g o r t o s e t a side a judgment for fraud upon the 
motion as6 proce^urefor obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
(AmenHnri p^?scribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
^
e n d e d effective April 1,1998.) 
Advisory Com •+ 
^endment elimhTf* N ° t e ' ~~ T h e 1 9 9 8 s e r v e d u p o n t h e d e f e n d a n t as required by Rule 
^ blowing. «(4) f a s ^ o u n d s for a motion 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
8l
*mmons in J~ . _\. w h e n » for any cause, the said action." This basis for a motion is not found 
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clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen- Cited in Dulin v. Cook, 957 F.2d 758 (10th 
sion of the time limitation contained in Rule 10, Cir. 1992). 
Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS 
OF TRIAL COURTS 
Rule 3- Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken 
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by 
law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but 
is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which 
may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as 
well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the 
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, 'or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice 
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof 
to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not 
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A 
certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If 
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name 
of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, 
joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the 
clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial 
court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment 
of the required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a 
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy 
of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has 
been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the 
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the 
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not 
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an appeal may be taken. Sait Lake City Corp. v. 
Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
A partial summary judgment is not generally 
a final judgment and hence it is not appealable 
under the limitations prescribed by this rule. 
South Shores Concession, Inc. v. State, 600 P.2d 
550 (Uta)i 1979). 
District court order setting aside certain pro-
visions in a default decree of divorce and pro-
viding for a further hearing on the matter was 
not a final ruling from which an appeal could be 
taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 (Utah 
1982). 
Postjudgrnent orders. 
An order vacating a judgment is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken pur-
suant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, 597 
P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979). 
The final judgment rule does not preclude 
review of postjudgrnent orders; such orders 
were independently subject to the test of final-
ity, according to their own substance and effect. 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). 
Purpose of notice . 
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise 
the opposite party tha t an appeal has been 
taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case. Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 
Utah 2d 126, 388 R2d 798 (1964). 
Review in equity cases . 
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme 
Court may weigh the facts as well as review the 
law, but will reverse on the facts only when the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v. 
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give 
due deference to the trial court's decision and 
reverse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's findings. 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
Rev iew of acquittal prohibited. 
An appellate court may not reassess an ac-
quittal even though the acquittal was made 
under an incorrect application of the law or an 
improper determination of the facts. State v 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
S u m m a r y judgment . 
Order setting aside summary judgment was 
not final judgment from which aggrieved per-
son might appeal as matter of right. Jensen v 
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). 
Order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment was not a final order and was not appeal-
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen-
dant alone is not a final judgment where the 
action against the remaining defendant re-
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d 1306 
(Utah 1983). 
/ , / Uns igned minute entry. 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute 
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
ning, 645 R2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State Tax 
Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1986); 
Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 1986); 
Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 (Utah 
1986). 
An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State v. 
Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 
1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Haz-
ardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998); City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965 
P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 2000 UT App 130, 1 P.3d 564, cert, 
granted, 9 R3d 170 (Utah 2000)f 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Case Law Develop-
ment: I. Appellate Review and Procedure, 1998 
Utah L. Rev. 585. 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 
465 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 4 
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
any other party may file a notice of appeal, within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in 
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice 
of appeal. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes . — The 1998 amend- motions under Rule 26 from the second sen-
ment added Subdivision (f). tence in Subdivision (b). 
The 1999 amendment deleted provisions for 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Administrative actions. 
Attorney fees. 
Attorney's failure to file notice. 
Cross-appeal. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
—Amendment or modification of judgment. 
—Construction. 
—Denied. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 




Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
—Final judgments. 
Administrative actions. 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for 
review of administrative actions. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The cross-appeal provisions of this rule do 
not apply to proceedings for judicial review of 
agency decisions. Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8, 412 Utah Adv. Rep. 
43, — P.3d —. 
Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Attorney's failure to file not ice . 
wv.™.** if Tiri+Vkin fKo cfnhitnrv nrriod for 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, STATE OP UTAH 
;iyra Margis . SCHEDULING ORDER 
CASE NO. 940905177 
VS . JUDGE LESLIE A LEWIS 
Bert Lietz 
COUNSEL ARE HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE THAT A HEARING HAS BEEN SET ON 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE ON THE 30th DAY OF April
 r 1998 AT 10:30 
AM WITH THE HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS. THE COURT HAS SCHEDULED 1/2 
HOUR FOR THIS HEARING. 
THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WILL BE ARGUED TO THE COURT: 
1. Letter written by Myra Margis dated 11/3/97 
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL WILL RESULT IN 
PLEADINGS BEING STRICKEN AND A DEFAULT ENTERED. COUNSEL ARE TO 
NOTIFY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY, IF THEIR CALENDAR DOES NOT PERMIT 
THIS HEARING. 
DATED THIS 5th DAY OF JAN,~;i998 
HONORABLE Leslie A' Lewis?fcP / 
Case No: 940905177 
Date: Jan 06, 1998 
CERTIFICATE*OF NOTICE 
I certify that a copy of the enclosed notice was sent to the 
following people by the method and on the date specified, 
DATE METHOD NAME 
01/06/98 Mail JEROLD D- MCPHIE 
VALLEY TOWER, 10TH FLOOR 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841010000 
01/06/98 Mail NATHAN D. PACE 
47 west 200 so, suite 102 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000 
Deputy Court Clerk 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court at 801-535-5009 at least three working days prior to 
the proceeding. 
Page 2 (last) 
NOVEMBER 3 , 1997 
NAIMAN I'AcE, ATTY. 
MR. M C E . Of J#90 5/?-} 
I AM WRITING YOU & JUDGE LESLEY LEWIS THIS LETTER OF FACTS IN 
REQUEST FOR A FULL REFUND AS YOU DID MOT & STILL HAVE NOT 
FOLLOWED UP ON MY CASE WHICH IPAIETFOR! "" 
BERT LIETZ WAS ALLOWED TO DO JUST AS HE HAS 
BEFORE TO RUN LOOSE & TAKE FROM INNOCENT PEOPLE. 
BERT HAD A DIRECT ORDER TO COMPLY FROM JUDGE LEWIS & DID NOT 
EVEN COME CLOSE TO HER REQUEST. SHE STATED H E M U S T D O 
BUT HEDID NOT & IS_ST_ILL LOOSE. YOU FORCED ME TO GO INTO HER 
CHAMBERS WITH AN UNTKLTH & Lttl AS A biQ JOKE & STILL IS. 1 
WAS ORDERED BY JUDGE LEWIS TO DO THIS & ACCEPT IT , I BELIEVE 
SHE TOLD ME. THIS JOKE OF A SETTLEMENT & I NEVER EVEN GOT 
THAT. I HAD TO DRIVE TWICE TO SLC & TWICE BERT DID NOT 
fftum v 
WHEN HE FINALLY DID SHOW UP HE COMES WITH A PICK UP TRUCK OF 
BINGO CLUB STUFF WHEN HE GOT AWAY WITH 2 30 FOOT RYDER TRUCKS 
FULL. BERT THREATENED ME , TRIED TO HIT YOU, TRIED TO HIT MY 
HUSBAND WITH HIS TRUCK WHICH HAD 2 DIFFERENT PLATES WHICH I 
CALLED BACK TO YOU & AGAIN YOU DID NOTHING. I DID NOT EVEN-
GET 1/3 OF MY STUFF BACK NOR THE PEOPLE'S THINGS, NOR MY 
MONEY BERT WAS ORDERED TO PAY BY JUDGE LEWIS, 
WHICH I WAS ENTITLED TO BY THE LAW THAT STATES THE JUDGES 
ORDERS ARE TO BE OBEYED. . WELL!!!!!!!!!!!?????? 
BERT STALKED ME TIL I HAD TO LEAVE SLC & FINALLY THE STATE. 
YOU WERE AT MY HOME WHEN HE WAS TO SEND THE MUSCLE PEOPLE TO 
STEAL MY PERSONAL BELONGINGS RIGHT OUT OF MY HOME. YOU HEARD 
THE THREATENING TAPES, YOU CALLED THIS SO CALLED MARSHALL, 
BERT GOT AWAY WITH THAT ALSO AS YOU DID NOTHING TIL WE HAD TO 
SELL & MOVE. & HE IS STILL BRAGGING HOW HE MADE MYRA'S BIG-
FANCY ATTORNEY COWTIE TO HIM. I AM TRULY SORRY I EVER GOT 
INVOLVED WITH YOU AS YOU ARE WITH ME T'M SURE. 
I HOPE MY REFUND ALONG WITH ALL MY TAPES OF THE CLUB & PAPERS 
I GAVE YOU WILL BE IN THE MAIL TO ME WITHIN THE WEEK. I WILL 
WAIT 1 WEEK, 5 WORKING DAYS, TO HEAR FROM YOU & JUDGE LEWIS 
CONCERNING THIS MATTER. THEN I WILL ASK FOR AN INQUIRY INTO 
JUDGE LEWIS, YOU & MCPHEE INTO THIS WHOLE JOKE OF A LEGAL 
SYSTEM ALONG WITH BERT. 
I NEVER GOT MY DAY IN COURT NOR MY SAY, BUT BERT WAS ALLOWED 
TO SPEAK TO THE JUDGE & LOOK WHAT HAPPENED. THIS MAN IS 
DEFINITELY A THREAT TO SOCIETY & ME & SHOULD BE STOPPED. 
REMEMBER JUDGE LEWIS'S CLERK, BERT & HIS ATTORNEY GOT AWAY 
WITH CHANGING THE COURT DATE SO YOU & I WOULD NOT BE THERE & 
OF COURSE I GOT BLAMED FOR A NO SHOW & YOU DID NOTHING ABOUT 
THAT EITHER. I FEEL I WAS TOTALLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST & YOU 
ALLOWED ALL OF THIS TO CONTINUE FOR 4/5 YEARS & IT SHOULD OF 
BEEN SETTLED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS OR WEEKS. BUT OF COURSE 
YOU GOT MORE MONIES THAT WAY. WELL I HOPE YOU WILL DO THE 
RIGHT THING AS A PERSON IF NOT AS AN ATTORNEY. 
MYRA MARGIS 
PO BOX 605 
MESQUITE. NV 89024-0605 
CC; NATHAN PACE 
<HJBGE«LESLEY_ LEW I Si 
MCPHEE, ATTORNEY 
UTAH BAR ASSOCIATION 
NOVEMBER 3. 1997 
NATHAN PACE, ATTY. 
MR. PACE, 
I AM WRITING YOU & -JUDGE LESLEY LEWIS THIS LETTER OF FACTS IN 
REQUEST FOR A FULL REFUND AS YOU DID NOT & STILL HAVE NOT 
FOLLOWED UP ON MY CASE WHICH 1 PAID FOR. 
BERT LIETZ WAS ALLOWED TO DO JUST AS HE HAS 
BEFORE TO RUN LOOSE & TAKE FROM INNOCENT PEOPLE. 
BERT HAD A DIRECT ORDER TO COMPLY FROM JUDGE LEWIS & DID NOT 
EVEN COME CLOSE TO HER REQUEST, SHE STATED H E M U S T D O 
BUT HE DID NOT & IS STILL LOOSE. YOU FORCED ME TO GO INTO HER 
CHAMBERS WITH AN UNTRUTH & LEFT AS A BIG JOKE & STILL IS. I 
WAS ORDERED BY JUDGE LEWIS TO DO THIS & ACCEPT IT , 1 BELIEVE 
SHE TOLD ME, THIS JOKE OF A SETTLEMENT & I NEVER EVEN GOT 
THAT. 1 HAD TO DRIVE TWICE TO SLC & TWICE BERT DID NOT 
COMPLY. 
WHEN HE FINALLY DID SHOW UP HE COMES WITH A PICK UP TRUCK OF 
BINGO CLUB STUFF WHEN HE GOT AWAY WITH 2 30 FOOT RYDER TRUCKS 
FULL. BERT THREATENED ME , TRIED TO HIT YOU, TRIED TO HIT MY 
HUSBAND WITH HIS TRUCK WHICH HAD 2 DIFFERENT PLATES WHICH I 
CALLED BACK TO YOU & AGAIN YOU DID NOTHING. I DID NOT EVEN 
GET 1/3 OF MY STUFF BACK NOR THE PEOPLE'S THINGS, NOR MY 
MONEY BERT WAS ORDERED TO PAY BY JUDGE LEWIS, 
WHICH I WAS ENTITLED TO BY THE LAW THAT STATES THE JUDGES 
ORDERS ARE TO BE OBEYED.. WELL!!!!!!!!!! !?????? 
BERT STALKED ME TIL I HAD TO LEAVE SLC & FINALLY THE STATE. 
YOU WERE AT MY HOME WHEN HE WAS TO SEND THE MUSCLE PEOPLE TO 
STEAL MY PERSONAL BELONGINGS RIGHT OUT OF MY HOME, YOU HEARD 
THE THREATENING TAPES, YOU CALLED THIS SO CALLED MARSHALL. 
BERT GOT AWAY WITH THAT ALSO AS YOU DID NOTHING TIL WE HAD TO 
SELL & MOVE. & HE IS STILL BRAGGING HOW HE MADE MYRA'S BIG 
FANCY ATTORNEY COWTIE TO HIM. I AM TRULY SORRY I EVER GOT 
INVOLVED WITH YOU AS YOU ARE WITH ME I'M SURE. 
I HOPE MY REFUND ALONG WITH ALL MY TAPES OF THE CLUB & PAPERS 
I GAVE YOU WILL BE IN THE MAIL TO ME WITHIN THE WEEK. I WILL 
WAIT I WEEK. 5 WORKING DAYS, TO HEAR FROM YOU & JUDGE LEWIS 
CONCERNING THIS MATTER. THEN I WILL ASK FOR AN INQUIRY INTO 
JUDGE LEWIS, YOU & MCPHEE INTO THIS WHOLE JOKE OF A LEGAL 
SYSTEM ALONG WITH BERT. 
I NEVER GOT MY DAY IN COURT NOR MY SAY, BUT BERT WAS ALLOWED 
TO SPEAK TO THE JUDGE & LOOK WHAT HAPPENED. THIS MAN IS 
DEFINITELY A THREAT TO SOCIETY & ME & SHOULD BE STOPPED. 
REMEMBER JUDGE LEWIS'S CLERK, BERT & HIS ATTORNEY GOT AWAY 
WITH CHANGING THE COURT DATE SO YOU & I WOULD NOT BE THERE & 
OF COURSE I GOT BLAMED FOR A NO SHOW & YOU DID NOTHING ABOUT 
THAT EITHER. I FEEL I WAS TOTALLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST & YOU 
ALLOWED ALL OF THIS TO CONTINUE FOR 4/5 YEARS & IT SHOULD OF 
BEEN SETTLED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS OR WEEKS. BUT OF COURSE 
YOU GOT MORE MONIES THAT WAY. WELL I HOPE YOU WILL DO THE 
RIGHT THING AS A PERSON IF NOT AS AN ATTORNEY. 
MYRA MARGIS 
PO BOX 605 
MESQUITE, NV 89024-0605 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I, STATE OP UTAH 
Myra Margis . SCHEDULING ORDER 
CASE NO. <\^0<\o 5 ^ 1 
VS . JUDGE LESLIE A LEWIS 
Bert Lietz . 
COUNSEL ARE HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE THAT THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON 
4/30/98 AT 10:30 IS HEREBY CONTINUED AND RESCHEDULED FOR 5/7/98 AT 
10:00 AM WITH THE HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS. THE COURT HAS SCHEDULED 
1/2 HOUR FOR THIS HEARING. 
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL WILL RESULT IN 
PLEADINGS BEING STRICKEN AND A DEFAULT ENTERED. COUNSEL ARE TO 
NOTIFY THE COURT IMMEDIATELY, IF THEIR CALENDAR DOES NOT PERMIT 
THIS HEARING. 
DATED THIS 7TH DAY OF JAN, 1998 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE 
I certify that a copy of the enclosed notice was sent to the 
following people by the method and on the date specified. 
DATE METHOD NAME 
01/07/98 
01/07/98 
Mail JEROLD D. MCPHIE 
VALLEY TOWER, 10TH FLOOR 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841010000 
Mail NATHAN D. PACE 
47 west 200 so, suite 102 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000 
(Y^'maM 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Paae 1 (last) 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
V S . 
BERT LIETZ, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
Defendant . : 
: NOTICE OF 
: PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
: Case No: 940905177 CV 
: Judge: LESLIE LEWIS 
: Date: May 1 3 , 1 9 9 8 
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/14/1998 
Time: 04:00 p.n. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS 
HEARING AND ARE TO BE PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND 
ISSUES IN CONFLICT. IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE 
WILL BE SCHEDULED. 
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO OPPOSING PARTIES, AS MAY SEEM JUST IN THE CASE. 
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY" TO SETTLE THE LAWSUIT MUST 
BE PRESENT. 
Dated this \ "b day of ,py> a v\ C ., « < & _ • 
LESLIE IiEWIS' 
D i s t r i c 
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Case No: 940905177 
Date: May 13, 1998 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 940905177 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JEROLD D. MCPHIE 
336 SOUTH 300 EAST SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841112504 
Mail NATHAN D. PACE 
136 SOUTH MAIN 
SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000 






In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court at 801-238-7391 at least three working days prior to 
the proceeding. 
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['' > f» •» o » 
NATHAN D. PACE, (6626) 
136 SOUTH, MAIN STREET SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 






MOTION FOR CONTEMPT 
AND TO STRIKE ANSWER 
AND ENTER JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940905177CV 
Judge: Leslie Lewis 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through her attorney Nathan D. Pace, and hereby moves 
the Court for an Order holding the Defendant in Contempt for failing to comply with the 
previously entered settlement stipulation before the Court, and if the Defendant fails to appear at 
the August 14, 1998 pretrial conference and otherwise comply with the Court order of holding 
meaningful settlement discussions prior to that Conference, that the Court should Strike 
defendant's answer and enter a default judgment on behalf of the plaintiff in this case. 
Plaintiff requests this motion be heard and argued by parties before the Court at the 
Pretrial scheduled for August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm. 
1 
The Parties previously came before the Court and prior to trial entered into and agreed to 
a stipulated settlement which was placed on the record by the Court and approved by the Court. 
Among the terms and as part of that stipulation, the Defendant was required to deliver the sum 
of $900.00 to the plaintiff and make an accounting of the items taken from the Plaintiff. The 
parties met at an appointed time to deliver the items to the Plaintiff and the delivered items were 
inventoried by Counsel for Plaintiff. Defendant handed counsel for Plaintiff a check for $900.00 
at that time. Counsel for Plaintiff requested that Defendant initial the inventory list when the 
delivery was completed, Defendant refused. When counsel again requested that he initial the 
inventory list, Defendant ripped the $900.00 check from counsel for Plaintiffs hand, and drove 
away in his truck, nearly running over Plaintiff. 
Several times during the ensuing months, Counsel for Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendant 
would discuss this matter. Counsel for Defendant would state that he was having a hard time 
communicating with his client, but that he would get him to redeliver the check as previously 
agreed to. However the check has never been delivered. As such, since the Defendant has 
shown a complete unwillingness to comply with the previous and what was intended to be a final 
stipulation and order of the Court regarding this matter, the Plaintiff moves the Court to hold the 
Defendant in Contempt for failing to Comply. 
Further, the Court has ordered the parties appear on August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm for a 
pretrial conference and to have held meaningful discussions as to settlement prior to that date. 
Counsel for Plaintiff believes that neither defendant nor Counsel for Defendant will attend nor will 
2 
they participate in discussions prior to the hearing. If Defendant's do not participate in good faith 
settlement discussions and if they do not attend the August 14, 1998 hearing, Plaintiff moves the 
Court to strike the Defendant's Answer in this matter and immediately enter a default judgment 
for the Plaintiff according to the terms contained in Plaintiffs complaint. 
Plaintiff should not be continually punished for Defendant's unwillingness to abide by the 
previous Order of the Court. 
Plaintiff further asks the Court to order Defendant to pay to Plaintiff an award of $2,500 
in attorneys fees in this matter which represent 20 hours at $125.00 which has been a more than 
reasonable amount of fees charged in thi^na^tter to date by Counsel for Plaintiff. 
DATED THIS
 L \ / day cX/RffV/ ~~ 1998. 
'Nafhan/D. Pace 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF-SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Ji_day of/ / / / 1998, I had a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Jerold D. Mcphee 
336 South 300 East #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
3 




Plaintiff, * HEARING 
vs. * Case No. 94C905177 
LIETZ, 
Defendant. * 
» * * * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of 
August, 1998 the Hearing in the above-entitled matter 
was neld at the above-entitled Court. This Hearing 
was electronically recorded. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: NATHAN D. PACE 
Attorney at Law 
47 West 200 South #102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 



















































P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. Tnis is Margis or Margis 
vs. Lietz. 
MR. PACE: Yes. 
THE CCURT: Oicay. And we appear to have 
some people here but not everybody here. 
MR. PACE: We have Nathan Pace for Myra 
Margis. I don't have any idea. I will tell the 
Court this, that I have called Mr. McPhie's office a 
number of times, I've actually filed a document witn 
the Court, I think, the Court has a copy of that 
Notice of Intent to Attempt to Enter Settlement 
Negotiations. I mailed that to m s office at the end 
of July listing every single day between tnen and now 
when I can be available, heard nothing. 
THE COURT: Well, we got a letter in 
February saying he was on active duty and not 
scheduled to be back in Salt Lake until early July. 
I wonder if he's even received notice. 
MR. PACE: He — Well, his — his law firm 
is still in business, they're tnere, they're 
answering the phone. 
THE COURT: I know, but I don't know what 
arrangements he has with them for coverage. Let's do 
this, I'd like to see what we can do to resolve this, 
and I can put dates in place now, but tnen if he 
can't live with them he's just going to ask us to 
reset them, and his client isn't here either. 
Why don't we set this over, Mr. Pace, and 
we'll notify him personally and indicate in the 
notice that failure to appear can result in pleadings 
being stricken or other sanctions, and I'm happy, if 
you can prove he received notice, to lacer order 
fees. 
MR. PACE: I understand that, and the 
position of — and I have — in each of the — I 
think the Court has noticed this three different — 
this year three different times. 
THE COURT: Have we? 
MR. PACE: I've ~ I've called the Court on 
behalf of his office saying that I knew he was out of 
the country. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. PACE: And that's why the Court kept 
bumping it, and in each one of those notes the Court 
said if you couldn't come tnen he needed to -- that 
his — if r.e didn't come or if he didn't snow up that 
the pleading would be stricken. 
I do know that his secretary, whoever I was 





1 they had received the notices from the Court and knew 
2 he wasn't going to be back. Rignt now I do know --
3 at least what they're telling me — is that he's in 
4 Missouri. ] 
5 But when it comes rignt down to it, what Mr. 
5 Lietz is doing is still grossly unfair to my client. 
7 We have --
8 THE COURT: Yes. It is. But, you know, in 
9 looking at our Notice of Pre-Trial Scheduling 
10 Conference we made a mistake. 
11 MR. PACE: What's that? 
12 THE COURT: It says on it the Court may 
13 impose other sanctions, it doesn't say what sanctions 
14 and it doesn't say under what circumstances we might 
15 impose sanctions. What it should say is failure to 
16 appear by either party or counsel can result in 
17 pleadings being stricken, and it doesn't exactly say 
18 that, at least on that document. Let me see if it 
19 does anywhere else. 
20 MR. PACE: In the last one that we received 
21 on the 13th of May — Well, you're right, that one 
22 does say the Court may impose other sanctions 
23 (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: All right. What I'm going to do 
25 is order attorneys fees. How much time have you put 
1 Page 6 
1 1 in getting ready for this and coming today and in 
1 2 getting back to your office? 
I 3 MR. PACE: Would that include the two 
1 4 motions that I filed the end of July? 
1 5 THE COURT: Yes. 
1 6 MR. PACE: Okay. I would say four hours at 
I 7 $120.00 an hour, including — 
1 8 THE COURT: You're awarded fees in that 
1 9 amount. Before we proceed with any kind of hearing 
110 beyond a scheduling conference, he's to pay that in 
111 full and provide proof of it. Ma'am, did you miss 
J12 work today? 
113 MS. MARGIS: No. I came from California 
114 again. 
15 THE COURT: Did you fly in from California? 
116 MS. MARGIS: No. We drove. 
117 THE COURT: Ai\d what do you think your gas 
118 costs were? You're entitled to be reimbursed too. 
19 MS. MARGIS: Just the gas alone? Well, 
20 probably — 
21 THE COURT: Well, no, and wear and tear on 
22 the car. What do you think it cost you? Did your 
23 husDand miss work? 
24 KS. MARGIS: No. Probably 5250.00. 



















































travel, and that is also to be paid before he gets 
any opportunity to present a position to this Court. 
I am appalled that he has chosen not to come. 
We are going to try one more time, and on 
the notice it is going to say the following, it is 
going to say that the Plaintiff may appear by phone, 
she need not appear in this jurisdiction for the next 
hearing. 
Mr. Pace, you can appear and your client can 
appear by phone. And what that means, ma'am, is Mr. 
Pace needs a phone number where we can reach you, and 
you don't have to come back to the State. You've 
come, you've tried. So the next time you don't need 
to appear, you just need to be available by pnone, 
and if he comes we'll call you. 
And if he does not come, and by he I mean 
the Defendant and/or Counsel, then a bench warrant 
will be issued on the Defendant and — well, what I'm 
going to do is strike the pleadings as well too. 
Michelle, in the notice it is to say exactly 
this, failure to appear by the Defendant or an 
Attorney for the Defendant, and it's an Attorney, and 
in parenthesis put Mr. McPhie or one of his partners 
will result, and will is to be underlined, not may, 
but will result in the Defendant's pleadings being 
stricken and judgment entered in favor of the 
Plaintiff. And let me ask you to prepare an order, 
Mr. Pace, detailing the fees. Yeah. 
MR. PACE: Okay. 
THE COURT: And, ma'am, I apologize. The 
reason I'm not doing it today is not because you're 
not entitled to it, because I'm afraid if I struck 
his pleadings today that they'd just appeal it, and 
because the notice was not as clear as it might have 
been, it would be set aside. 
So what I'm trying to do is get you what you 
need and make sure it sticks. So you don't need to 
come back, we'll save you another trip, you'll be 
reimbursed for what you've expended getting here. 
If you had meals on the way, you're entitled 
to be re-paid for those, so you think about that, and 
if you want to file an affidavit, Mr. Pace, 
augmenting the 5250.00, which seems very modest to 
me, she's entitled to receive tnat as well. 
MR. PACE: Let me ask her right now if I 
could for a second. 
THE COURT: Okay. You bet. 
MR. PACE: Your Honor, she ~ she was 
contemplating -- the $250.00 was representing the 
cost of getting here. She thinks that it's more like 
Page 7 J 
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a 5500.00 round trip for her — 
THE COURT: To get back? 
MR. PACE: Well, the total round trip. 
THE COURT: And she's thinking of gas and 
wear and tear on the vehicle? 
MR. PACE: Gas and food and motel, she 
figured in the motel. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to find 
that, unless there is an objection, $500.00 is 
ordered to be paid. I think that's appropriate. 
We've been, it seems to me, considerably fair to the 
other side and the point has come where I'm 
disinclined to bend over backwards to accommodate 
them any longer. 
So I'll order that and let's hope we can get 
this resolved. Let me give you a new date right now, 
Mr. Pace, that you can live with, and Mr. McPhie will 
have to live with it. Michelle, when could we do it? 
We just need thirty minutes. 
COURT CLERK: We could actually do it next 
Friday at 4:00 o'clock. 
THE COURT: Well, that's pretty quick, and 
that's what we'll do, the 21st of August at 4:00 
o'clock. And I'm going to ask this of you, Counsel, 
I'm going to ask that you prepare the notice and fax 
Page 10 
it to Mr. McPhie's office on Monday and also mail it 
to him. 
MR. PACE: Okay. 
THE COURT: That way there can be no 
question about it. 
MR. PACE: Okay. 
THE COURT: And if he isn't here and/or his 
client isn't here, either one of them chooses to 
absent themselves, it's a done deal without 
Ms. — Margis is it? 
MS. MARGIS: Margis. 
THE COURT: Margis — I apologize — having 
to reappear. 
MR. PACE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else that we need to 
talk about today? 
MS. MARGIS: I would like to say something 
if it's all right. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. MARGIS: On the stuff that he returned 
to us after that very frightening day that we spent 
with him at the storage unit, none of it worked. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't want to get 
into that until he's here, but that would be 



















































Counsel, in case he isn't here next Friday and you're 
going to be moving for judgment, all cf those things 
can be clarified. 
MR. PACE: And if we move for judgment the 
amount that we've plead in the pleadings is 
sufficient to cover that. 
THE COURT: Did that take into account — 
MR. PACE: It does. 
THE COURT: -- the fact that none of the 
property was operable? 
MR. PACE: It does, because we specifically 
plead for punitive damages on things that weren't 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MARGIS: Yeah. He took all of this and 
returned this this. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. MARGIS: Eut nothing worked. 
THE COURT: And so basically the complaint 
asked for the full amount and that's what you'll get. 
MR. PACE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And your husband looks a little 
discouraged, go buy him a nice dinner. 
MS. MARGIS: He's sick. 
THE COURT: Oh, he's sick, I'm sorry to hear 
that, sir. Well, he still deserves a nice dinner. 
Take care of yourselves. 
MR. MARGIS: I will. 
THE COURT: Sorry we were not able to 
accomplish more. Yes. 
MR. PACE: A question on your order. The — 
The order — The amount you just ordered has to be 
paid before a case can be presented? 
THE COURT: Yes. It does not mean that he 
can't come in, it means that if he gets beyond the 
scheduling conference — 
MR. PACE: Okay. That that would need to 
be — 
THE COURT: Right. It wouid need to be paid 
before a hearing or a trial where they raise any 
defenses or issues. 
MR. PACE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PACE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. And who is we? 
MR. PACE: Myself. I represent Myra Margis. 
The Court excused her. She's in California. 
THE COURT: Where is the other side? 
MR. PACE: The other side isn't here. They 
weren't here last week and the Court issued an order 
that if they didn't show you would strike their 
answer and enter a default judgment. 
THE COURT: I do remember that, Nathan. Let 
me note that this was set for 4:00 o'clock, we've 
given them the grace time of fifteen minutes, it's 
now 4:17. Your motion to have the pleading stricken 
and relief sought by your client granted is — 
MR. PACE: For the record — 
THE COURT: — acceded to. 
MR. PACE: For the record, the notice that 
I've submitted to the Court I faxed to them on 
Monday, as well as mailed, as well as we received the 
notice from the Court as to this hearing we faxed 
that as well to them. 
THE COURT: You've bent over backwards. 
Thank you for taking the time to refresh my 
recollection. I do remember this, and I'm sorry it 
wasn't originally on my schedule. I did have good 
clerks who pulled the file. And you're absolutely 
correct, that is what I said before. 
The relief you sought is granted, the Court 
finds, based upon your representation, based upon my 
knowledge of the case, notice went out and was 
received, there has been no response either in 
writing or by virtue of an appearance today. 
MR. PACE: The amount --
THE COURT: I have one person today 
apparently I made happy. What else, Mr. Pace? 
MR. PACE: The amount of the default — The 
amount of the judgment should be $67,200.00 as prayed 
for in the complaint, together with after recurring 
interest. It was filed on May of 1994 and we'd ask 
interest from that date forward. 
THE COURT: Now, that I think is 
problematic. Certainly you're entitled to have 
judgment for $67,200.00 and you're entitled to the 
appropriate interest on that from date of judgment. 
What is your theory on pre-judgment interest? 
MR. PACE: Just, if the pleadings were 
stricken then — Just a question as to whether the 
interest pre-judgment reverts back co the date of the 
filing or from the date of judgment. 
THE COURT: That's a good question. I could 
Uorto 1 
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1 be wrong on this. 
2 MR. PACE: I don't know. 
3 THE COURT: And if you believe I am, you 
4 could give me legal authority, but that does not 
5 strike me as equitable, because there has been, at 
6 the very least, a good faith basis for the other side 
7 at least believing that this was not going tc result 
8 in past interest being accrued. 
9 So in my discretion judgment is entered for 
10 the full amount, interest will start to accrue from 
11 this day forward. I'm granting judgment today. I'll 
12 sign the pleadings on Monday if you submit them, and 
13 I'll date it today's date, because that's when I'm 
14 entering judgment. But I am declining to impose 
15 pre-judgment interest. 
16 MR. PACE: Okay. In the — Okay. Thank 
17 you, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Anything else? 
19 MR. PACE: In the pleading we had — In the 
20 pleading we had requested attorneys fees. I — 
21 THE COURT: You're entitled to them. 
22 MR. PACE: Okay. 
123 THE COURT: Would you provide me with an 
24 affidavit delineating the time spent, addressing the 
125 issue of reasonableness and necessity, and attach any 
I Page 6 
1 1 billing records you've got that are supportive of the 
1 2 same, and I will award a reasonable fee. 
3 MR. PACE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
1 4 THE COURT: Thank you. Sorry I was a little 
1 5 grumpy. It's been a very long day. 
1 6 MR. PACE: It sounds like it. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 







CASE NO. 940905177 
The Court has before it several Notices to Submit, filed 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration/ 
in connection with defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 
Pleading from 10 October 2000 through Present, defendant's Motion 
to Quash and Recall Garnishment and Motion to Enlarge Time and the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order. The Court has carefully 
considered each of these Motions and has also thoroughly reviewed 
the file in this matter. 
It appears that this matter came "before the Court for a pre-
trial conference on June 14, 1996. According to the Minutes for 
this conference, the parties indicated to the Court that they had 
reached a stipulation. The stipulation was read into the record 
and the trial date was stricken. Counsel for the plaintiff was 
instructed to prepare the Order dismissing the case based on the 
stipulation. 
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In response to a letter written to the Court by the plaintiff, 
dated November 3, 1997, the Court scheduled a hearing for April 30, 
1998 • For unclear reasons, it does not appear that this hearing 
was ever held. Instead, because an Order of dismissal was never 
prepared, the Court scheduled a pretrial/scheduling conference for 
August 14, 1998. The Minutes for the August 14, 1998, hearing, 
indicate that the defendant and his counsel, Mr. McPhie, failed to 
appear. The Court granted the plaintiff attorneyfs fees and 
travel costs, totaling $98 0. The hearing was then re-scheduled 
for August 21, 1998, with a warning from the Court that if Mr. 
McPhie or one of his associates failed to appear again, the 
defendant's pleading would be stricken and judgment entered against 
him. 
On August 21, 1998, Mr. McPhie again failed to appear and the 
Court granted the plaintiff's request to strike the defendant's 
Answer and enter judgment in her favor. The judgment amount 
granted was $67,200, together with interest to accrue from the date 
of the hearing. Attorney's fees were also granted. The Order and 
Judgment was entered on August 28, 1998. 
On September 2, 1998, the defendant filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and Attorney's Fees. The basis for this Motion was 
that Mr. McPhie had been on military duty during the time that the 
two hearings were scheduled and was unable to attend. From the 
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point that the defendant filed this Motion to Set Aside, the record 
becomes more confusing because the file contains motions filed on 
behalf of the defendant by Mr, McPhie, by a Mr. Ziter (who entered 
an appearance of counsel on September 28, 1999) and by the 
defendant himself on a pro se basis. It appears that Mr. Ziter 
eventually withdrew as defendant's counsel and was replaced by the 
defendant's original attorney, Mr. McPhie. However, throughout the 
time of his representation by both counsel, the defendant was also 
submitting his own motions and pleadings, including a Motion to 
Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal, discussed below. 
On December 18, 2000, the Court considered the defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and denied it. An Order denying the 
Motion was entered contemporaneously. 
On February 6, 2001, the defendant filed a second Motion and 
Memorandum to Set Aside Order and Rule on Outstanding Motions. 
This Motion essentially asks the Court to clarify the record by 
ruling on the defendant's Motion to Strike (the plaintiff's 
response to the original Motion to Set Aside as untimely), Motion 
to Release Funds and defendant's Objection to the plaintiff's 
proposed Order. It should have been clear to the defendant when 
the Court entered the plaintiff's proposed Order on December 18, 
2000, that the defendant's Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and 
Objection were also being denied. However, to clarify the record, 
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the Court now rules that although it was not expressly stated, the 
Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and Objection were indeed 
denied upon the Court's entry of the December 18, 2000, Order. 
On March 12, 2001, the Court received an Order of Dismissal 
that was filed by the defendant on a pro se basis. The Court 
entered this Order on March 14, 2001, because at first glance it 
appeared to reflect the reality that the parties reached an accord 
and satisfaction during the June 14, 1996, hearing before the 
Court. However, since the plaintiff filed her Motion to Strike 
Order, the Court has had an opportunity to further reflect on the 
propriety of this Order and whether it indeed conflicts with the 
events that transpired after the June 14, 1996, hearing and with 
the existing Judgment and Order already entered by the Court on 
August 28, 1998. The Court now determines that the Order of 
Dismissal does conflict with the prior Judgment and Order. In 
addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever 
reached an accord and satisfaction because a formal Order 
dismissing the case based on the June 14, 1996, stipulation was 
never prepared and entered. Accordingly, the Court grants the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike and vacates the Order of Dismissal 
entered on March 14, 2 001. Furthermore, the defendant's Motion to 
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Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment, which is based on the now-
vacated Order of Dismissal, is also denied,1 
Finally, the Court considers the defendant's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiff's Pleadings from 10 October 2000. While the plaintiff 
has apparently mailed certain of her pleadings to an incorrect 
address for the defendant, striking the plaintiff's pleadings is 
too harsh a remedy, particularly where it does not appear that the 
defendant has been prejudiced by this mistake. Plaintiff is to 
ensure that she corrects her mailing address for the defendant for. 
all future filings. The defendant's Motion to Strike is denied. 
In future if the defendant is represented by counsel, any 
motions should be filed by counsel. 
This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this r ^ day of August, 2001. 
H 
LESLIE A. LEWI'S * 
DISTRICT COURT\JUDGE 
1
 To clarify the record, in light of the Court's decision to vacate the Order of Dismissal, 
the defendant's Motion to Quash and related Motion to Enlarge Time are moot. However, in the 
interest of justice, the Court granted the Motion to Enlarge and considered the defendant's late-
filed Reply to the plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to Quash. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the 
foregoing Court ' s Ruling, t o t h e following, t h i s r day of 
August, 2001: 
Nathan D. Pace 
David S. Pace 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main, Suite 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jerold D. McPhee 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South 3 00 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2537 
\ 
VY\ 
^ U ' 
DAVID PACE (8252) 
NATHAN D. PACE. P.C. (6626) 
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, by and 
MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER 
Civil No. 940905177 CV 
Judge: Lewis 
through Counsel, and hereby moves the court 
that the Order of Dismissal signed by the Court on March 14, 2001, be stricken from the record 
or corrected. Pursuant to URCP R. 60 (a), Plaintiff believes that this Order of Dismissal was 
signed as a clerical mistake, or that it requires clarification to reflect the Court's intent. In the 
alternative. Plaintiff believes that the Order of Dismissal should be set aside pursuant to URCP R. 
60(4) or (6), as being void or (for clarification) as any other reason justifying relief. This motion 
is brought within a reasonable time. The attached Memorandum of Points is provided in support. 
DATED this July ]X 2001. 
By: I y . 
David hJTPace 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of foregoing 
MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER to the following by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on July 
2001, at: 
Jerold D. McPhee . 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2504 
ph. (801) 322-1616 
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DAVID PACE (8252) 
NATHAN D. PACE, P.C. (6626) 
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, b y anc 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER 
Civil No. 940905177 CV 
Judae: Lews 
through Counsel, and hereby submits this 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of her Motion to Strike Order, concerning an 
Order of Dismissal signed by the Court on March 14. 2001 
FACTS REGARDING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
1. The Order of Dismissal was never the subject of any Motion to Submit ever filed with the 
Court. 
2. Defendant submitted the Order to the Court pro se although he has continually been 
represented by counsel, and was represented by Counsel at the time. 
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3. The Order was signed by the Court on March 14, 2001, and the accompanying certificate 
of sendee was filed on March 12, 2001. (attached) 
4. The time differential of the filing and signing of this order indicates that regardless of 
notice, Plaintiff was given no opportunity to review7 or object to the contents of the Order. 
5. No Rule 4-504 notice is attached to the Order or reflected in any Court Filing. 
6. Plaintiff or Counsel never received any copy of a proposed order despite the mailing 
certificate. 
7. Plaintiffs Counsel did not receive any actual notice that this Order had been submitted to 
or signed by the Court until delivered by Defendant's attorney as part of a Motion to 
Quash Garnishment (attached) which was received on July 9. 2001. 
8. The Third District Court Clerk still lists a judgment being in effect for this case, entered on 
August 28,1998, in the amount of $70,180.00. 
FACTS REGARDING CASE HISTORY 
9. The Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, addresses a settlement agreement heard 
by the court on June 14, 1996. 
10. The Defendant's noncompliance with the settlement agreement of June 14, 1996. was the 
subject matter of the hearings to be addressed by the Court on August 14, 1998, and 
August 21,1998, as requested by Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt and to Strike .Answer 
and Enter Judgment, which was filed on July 31, 1998. (attached) 
. ? . 
The hearings on August 14, 1998, and August 21,1998, were attended by neither the 
Defendant nor Counsel for Defendant. 
Defendant's .Answer was stricken and Judgment was entered against him on August 28, 
1998, as sanctions for non-appearance at the hearings of August 14, 1998, and August 21, 
1998. 
On September 2, 1998, Defendant through his attorney, filed a Motion to set aside the 
judgment, wrhich the Court had previously ruled would not be heard until Defendant 
tendered $980.00 in costs and attorney fees to the Court. 
On October 8, 1998. the Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's motion to set aside the 
judgment. 
On October 15, 1998, Defendant, through his attorney, filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs 
response to Defendant's motion to set aside. 
Defendant tendered court-ordered sanctions of S980.00 to the Court on October 5, 2001, 
which the Court had ordered to be a prerequisite to any further rulings on the case. 
On October 6, 2001, Defendant, through his attorney, filed a notice to submit on his 
motion to set aside the judgment and his motion to strike Plaintiffs response. 
On November 15, 2001, based on Defendant's Notice to Submit, the Court denied 
Defendant's Motion to set aside the judgment, and ordered that the Judgment would 
remain in effect, (attached) 
On November 24, 2000, Defendant, through his attorney, submitted a Proposed Order 
reflecting the Court's denial of Defendant's motion to set aside judgment, and the Plaintiff 
filed an objection to the Defendant's proposed Order on December 4, 2000. 
On December 4, 2000, Plaintiff submitted a proposed Order reflecting the Court's denial 
of Defendant's Motion to set aside Judgment, and the Defendant, through counsel, filed an 
objection to Plaintiffs proposed order on December 11, 2000. 
On December 19, 2000, the Court apparently reviewed both Proposed Orders and both 
sets of Objections, and the Court signed the Plaintiffs proposed Order reflecting the 
Court's Denial of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. 
In addition, on December 4, 2000. Plaintiff filed a motion to release funds held by the 
Court, to which Defendant through counsel, filed an objection on December 11, 2000. 
On December 18, 2000, the court executed the Plaintiffs proposed Order Releasing 
Funds. 
On February 2, 2001, Defendant, through Counsel, filed a notice to submit for decision on 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Response, Defendant's Proposed Order regarding 
the Defendant's Motion to set aside judgment, Plaintiffs Objection to same, Plaintiffs 
Motion for Release of Funds, Defendant's Opposition to same, and Defendant's Objection 
to Plaintiffs Proposed Order regarding Defendant's Motion to set aside Judgment. 
(attached) 
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25. None of these motions or orders had any relation to the Order to Dismiss filed with the 
court by the Defendant, pro se, on March 12. 2001, and signed on March 14, 2001. 
26. The Third District Court Clerk's log indicates that the Notice to Submit of February 2, 
2001, was delivered to the Court for Decision on March 12, 2001. 
27. While several of the orders and motions referenced in Plaintiffs Notice to Submit of 
February 2,2001. appear to have previously been decided by the Court, the Order of 
Dismissal signed on March 14, 2001, does not address any of the issues contained in the 
motions and orders contained in the notice to submit. 
28. A valid Writ of Garnishment to First Security Bank was issued by the Court on 10 April 
2001 and served on 12 April 2001, without objection by Defendant. 
29. A valid Writ of Garnishment to America First Credit Union was issued by the Court on 26 
June 2001 and served on 28 June 2001. 
30. Defendant, by counsel, filed a Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment on 5 July 
2001, based on the Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, effective June 14, 1996. 
31. Plaintiffs Counsel first received actual notice or knowledge of Defendant's Order of 
Dismissal signed March 14,2001, effective June 14, 1996, as an addendum to Defendant's 
Motion to Quash Garnishment, which was received on July 9, 2001. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE ORDER OF MARCH 14, 2001, APPEARS TO BE SIGNED AS A CLERICAL ERROR 
BY THE COURT, AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a) 
Even though a valid Judgment remains in place against Defendant, Plaintiff believes that 
the Order of Dismissal wTas signed as a mistake or clerical error by the Court. On February 2. 
2001, Defendant's Counsel submitted a Notice to Submit encompassing seven different 
procedural motions, objections, and orders. Court records indicate that on March 12, 2001. the 
Notice to Submit was delivered to Judge Lewis for ruling, on the same day that Defendant pro se 
filed a totally separate Order of Dismissal with the Court. Plaintiffs counsel never received a 
copy of this order or was given any opportunity to respond to the order. On March 1*4, 2001. at 
most two days after being filed, that Order of Dismissal was signed by the Court, although it was 
never the subject of any Notice to Submit or other Motion before the court. 
URCP 60(a) allows that clerical mistakes in "orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight.. .may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or 
on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any. as the court orders." As a clerical error 
or mistake, the signed Order of Dismissal should be stricken by the Court immediately. The 
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Court should require that Defendant present his Order of Dismissal by regular motion, with an 
opportunity for response by Plaintiff, before being considered for signature by the Court. 
THE SUBSTANCE OF DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS SET ASIDE BY THE 
COURT WHEN JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT ON AUGUST 285 
1998, FOR NON-APPEARANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. AN ACCORD WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT. BUT 
NOT SATISFACTION. PURSUANT TO URCP 60(a), THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE OR 
CORRECT THE ORDER TO PREVENT THE APPEARANCE OF A MISTAKE IN THE 
RECORD 
URCP 60(a) provides that clerical errors in orders may be corrected at any time. A 
Clerical amendment to an order "is one which is intended to make the judgment speak the truth by 
showing what the judicial action really wras..." Richards v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314,471 P.2d 
143 (Utah 1970). A clerical error is not a "judicial errors"; A clerical amendment cannot correct a 
judicial decision by ''making [a judgment] express something which the court did not pronounce, 
and did not intend to pronounce, in the first instance." Richards. Plaintiff submits that the 
Defendant's Order of Dismissal does not accurately reflect the actual rulings of the Court, and as 
such should be stricken or corrected. 
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The Defendant's Order of Dismissal decrees that "the parties did reach an accord and 
satisfaction in this matter." The record of the hearing on June 14,1996, indicates that while the 
Court recognized that an agreement for settlement was reached (an accord), satisfaction of that 
agreement was never provided. The extensive proceedings following that hearing, and the 
Court's eventual entering of Judgment against the Defendant on August 28, 1998, are the result 
of the Court's actual determination that the Defendant had not complied with or provided 
satisfaction to that settlement agreement and subsequent court orders. 
Quickly addressing the content of Defendant's Order of Dismissal, the Order is based on a 
settlement agreement made in Court on June 14,1996. Defendant's noncompliance with the 
settlement agreement was the subject of Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt filed July 31,1998. In 
the Motion, Plaintiff submitted to the Court that Defendant ripped the settlement check from 
Plaintiffs attorney's hand and drove away, nearly running knocking down Plaintiffs attorney 
Nathan Pace with his truck. For the next two years Defendant refused to redeliver the check or 
participate in attempts to comply with the settlement agreement. The Motion for Contempt was 
scheduled for hearing on August 14,1998, and August 21,1998. Defendant's nonappearance at 
the Court hearings of August 14, 1998, and August 21,1998, was the basis for Judgment being 
entered against him. Judgment was entered against Defendant on August 28,1998, as sanctions 
for non-compliance with the settlement agreement addressed in Defendant's Order of Dismissal. 
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Defendant's Order of Dismissal states that an accord and satisfaction was completed on 
June 14, 1996. While an initial settlement agreement was reached in court, Satisfaction was never 
delivered. Defendant did not comply with the settlement agreement or with further court orders. 
As sanctions for Defendant's non-compliance, Defendant's Answer was stricken and judgment 
wras entered against him. As sanctions for Defendant's non-compliance, the settlement agreement 
and the potential dismissal of the case was voided. While an order could be entered reflecting the 
court hearing of June 14, 1996, the Order of Dismissal does not clearly reflect the status of this 
case. The Order should reflect that notwithstanding the settlement agreement, Judgment wTas 
entered against Plaintiff on August 28,1998. To correct the appearance of an oversight in the 
record, the Court should strike the Defendant's Order of Dismissal or correct it to reflect that 
Judgment was subsequently entered against Defendant. URCP 60(a) again provides that the 
Court may make this correction at any time of its own initiative. 
DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF MARCH 14, 2001, SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
AS BEING VOID PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(4) 
The Order of Dismissal signed on March 14, 2001, indicates that this case was dismissed 
effective 14 June 1996. Notwithstanding a settlement agreement being reached on that date, the 
Defendant's answer was subsequently stricken by the Court and Judgment was entered against 
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him on August 28, 1998. As such the dismissal referred to in Defendant's Order of Dismissal is 
void and should be stricken from the record by the Court. 
DEFENDANT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF MARCH 14, 2001, SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
OR AMENDED IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE STATUS OF THE COURT'S ORDERS, AS 
"ANY OTHER REASON" PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(6) 
This Court entered Judgment against the Defendant on August 28,1998, even though the 
parties had previously reached a settlement agreement. While the Third District Court Clerk's 
record still accurately reflects that a valid judgment has been entered against the Defendant, the 
presence of an Order of Dismissal in the record effective two years prior to the Entry of Judgment 
creates the possibility of confusion regarding the Court's orders. The Defendant has filed a 
motion to quash a valid garnishment based on this Order of Dismissal. In the event that the Court 
does not seek to clarify this as a clerical matter under URCP 60(a), the Court should clarify the 
order under the authority of URCP 60(b)(6). 
"A Motion for 'Clarification of Judgment' is not specifically provided for in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the substance of the motion is to make clear a judgment that 
it is not already clear. If the clarity of the judgment is called into question because the opposing 
party is improperly applying the judgment, then implicit in the motion is a request to change the 
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judgment to provide relief to a party harmed by the lack of clarity. Accordingly, we hold that in 
the case before us, appellees motion for clarification, in which appellants joined, was sufficient to 
invoke Rule 60(b)." Kunzler v. O'delL 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 855 P.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1993). 
"A court may grant relief under subsection seven [six] of Rule 60(b) for any reason other 
than the first six [five] enumerated by the rule if relief is justified, and the motion is made within a 
reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. Inc.. 817 P.2d 
382, 387 (Utah App. 1991). Kunzler v. O'delL Plaintiff does not claim "(1) Mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;" as the basis of this 60(b) motion because the 
Judgment entered against Defendant on August 28,1998, has correctly not been affected by the 
Order of Dismissal. Two valid garnishments have been issued by the Court subsequent to the 
Defendant's Order of Dismissal, one on April 10, 2001, and one on June 26, 2001. This motion is 
also not based on "(3) fraud." This 60(b)(6) motion is for the purpose of clarifying the Court's 
Record concerning this Order of Dismissal, so that it remains clear to Court personnel or other 
judges evaluating the validity of writs of garnishment that a valid Judgment has been entered and 
affirmed by this court (on November 15, 2001), despite the entry of dismissal at a prior date. 
For greatest clarity of the record the Order of Dismissal should be stricken, with a new 
Order prepared which clearly describes the record of this Case. The Court should require that 
Defendant present his Order of Dismissal by regular motion, with an opportunity for response by 
Plaintiff, before being considered for signature by the Court. In the alternative the Court should 
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correct the Order to reflect that despite the previous settlement agreement a Judgment was 
subsequently entered against Defendant. 
TIMELINESS 
Relief under URCP 60 (a) may be sought "at any time/" Relief under URCP 60 (4) or (6) 
must be sought within "a reasonable time.*' The Court has issued two valid garnishments since 
the entry of the Order of Dismissal. Defendant has created an apparent need for clarification of 
the Order of Dismissal only in the last ten days by filing a Motion to Quash the latest Writ of 
Garnishment. This motion is filed four months after the Order was signed, and less than one week 
after Plaintiff first received actual notice of the Order of Dismissal. No party has been prejudiced 
to this point in the passage of time from the signing of the Order of Dismissal. This motion is 
timely. 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING RELIEF: 
1. That pursuant to URCP 60(a), as a clerical error or mistake, the Order of Dismissal signed 
March 14, 2001, effective June 14, 1996, should be stricken by the Court immediately. 
The Court should require that Defendant present his Order of Dismissal by regular motion, 
with an opportunity for response by Plaintiff, before being entered by the Court. 
2. That pursuant to URCP 60(a), to correct the appearance of an oversight in the record, the 
Court should strike the Defendant's Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, effective 
-12-
June 14,1996, or correct it to reflect that Judgment was subsequently entered against 
3. That pursuant to URCP 60(b)(4), the dismissal referred to in Defendant's Order of 
Dismissal is void and should be stricken from the record by the Court. 
4. That pursuant to URCP 60(b)(6), to clarify the Judgment entered in this case and avoid 
the appearance of #n oversight in the record, the Court should strike the Defendant's 
Order of Dismissal signed March 14, 2001, effective June 14. 1996, or correct it to reflect 
that Judgment was subsequently entered against Defendant 
DATED this July/£ 2001. 
By: (_^^ j 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER to the following by 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on July jX 2001, at: 
3eto\QD.McP,nee 
336 South 300 East Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -2504 
ph. (801) 322-1616 
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BERT LIETZ 
4901 SOUTH LAURA DRIVE 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICTPCOURT:~ :< 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3Y PERSONAL SERVICE 
[ORDER OF DISMISSAL (16 JUNE 1996)] 
I certify thai on this l^-~ day of March 2001,1 personally placed a true and 
correct copy of the "Order of Dismissal referencing the court decision on 16 June-1996," 
in a sealed envelope. I further certify that the same was placed in the United States Postal 
System, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Natha Pace 
136 South Main Street, Suite 404 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84101 
ui I i . - . i l I C Ail i i ; 
"ih l 
CASE NUMBER: g9C9099C2€SL-
JUDGE LESLIE .A LEWIS 
FSL59 3SSTWST COURT 
Tftirc" J'-'cicis.! District 
BERTLIETZ
 / y , . 4 © v 
4901 SOUTH LAURA DRIVE \ Y \OY H , 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 ^ - ^ ^ < ^ ^ 7 ^ 
(801)268-1436
 Sy I ^ V S S r a S r 
IN THE THIRD JUDICLAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MYRA MARGIS, } 
PLAINTIFF, } CASE NUMBER: 940905177CV 
V. } 
BERT LIETZ, } JUDGE LESLIE A, LEWIS 
DEFENDANT. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
This matter came before the coun on 14 June 1996; her counsel Nathan Pace 
reoresented the siaintin, while his anomev. Jerold McPhee. represented the defendant. 
The parties reached an accord and satisfaction relating to this matter and agreed to this 
action being dismissed. The foBowing facts are provided for the coun: 
On 14 June 1996 the parties reached an accord and satisfaction, as follows: 
"Mr. Lietz will return to Myra Margis all bingo equipment 
taken from the Carousel Club, as well as any other 
personal property of any - * either Mrs. Margis or any of 
the people who were there, the patrons of the carousel 
Mr. Lietz will make no claim on the automobiles that 
secure Mr. Margis' debt to him. Both parties sign the 
mutual release of all claims against the either party and 
there will be the mutual restraining order in effect between 
the parties."' 
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Order of Dismissal 
Civil Number: 9-^ 0905177CV 
Plaintiff: MyraMargis 
Defendant: Ben Lietz 
The coun questioned the panies relating to the above accord and satisfaction, both 
parties acknowledged their acceptance. The coun then accepted the accord and 
satisfaction and order Mr. Pace to prepare the paperwork for dismissal A copy of the 
transcript is incorporated and marked Embit UA.~ Also provided is a copy of the money 
order, which is bcorporated and marked as Exhibit "3."' A statement relating to the 
return of the propeny was previously filed with the coun. 
Therefore, the defendant has complied with the accord and has satisfied the matter 
and the maner was thusly dismissed. 
Plaintiffs anorney was ordered during this hearing to prepare and submit the 
necessary paperwork to dismiss this action, he failed to. This was a willful and deliberate 
violation on Mr. Pace's pan. because the coun clearly ordered him to do it and the rules 
of judicial Administration. Rule —504 requires it. His failure is a clear contempt of the 
courts order and will be made an issue separately on an order to show cause. The 
following is the couns own words: 
I will allow you. then. Mr. Pace, to prepare the documents 
concerning dismissal. 
Mr. Pace the acknowledge the couns order by stating. "That's fine." 
The defendant has taken it upon himself to prepare the paperwork and is 
submitting it for signature. 
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Order of Dismissal 
Civil Number: 940905177CV 
Plaintiff: MyraMargis 
Defendant: Bert Lietz 
Therefore, the court after reviewing the defendant's dismissal and a full review of 
transcript and other documents provided, and the court record and upon good cause 
appearing the court orders the following: 
It is hereby adjudged decreed, and ordered that: 
1. The parties did reach an accord and satisfaction in this matter. Furthermore. 
the court, in open court and on the record accepted the accord and satisfaction as 
represented and accepted by both parties. 
2. Once the court accepted the settlement agreement the court ordered the case to 
be dismissed and order the plaintiffs attorney to prepare the documents for its dismissal. 
Clearly from the record the plaintiffs attorney failed to comply with this courts order. 
3. The effective date of dismissal is 14 June 1996. 
Therefore, this action is dismissed with prejudice effective 14 June 1996. 
Dated this ' / aav of March 2001. 
Exhibit "A" 
IN TH3 THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^ o M r ) p T r 
IN AND POP. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE « „ « " 
MYRA MARGIS 
vs 
= S R T LIETZ 
CASS NO. S40S05177C V 
Defendant 
di?ORS THE HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
'ORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OR PROCEEDINGS 
JUNE 14 13 9 6 
REPORTED BY: Kathleen Schultz, CSR 
E A R A N C E S 
FOR !E PLAINT 
'HE DEEENDAN: 
NATHAN D. PACE 
PACE, 3R0ADHEAD & NICKLS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
47 west 200 South, No. 102 
Salt Lake City, UT S4101 
JSROLD D. MCPHES 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Salt Lake (Tiny, Utah; June 14, 19S6; P.M. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're on the record in the 
matter of Myra Margis --
MR. PACE: No. 
did I mispronounce it? 
in^ C U J R T : -- versus 3ert Lietz. • "! l 
indicate it's case number 3409 0 5177 
S 
1 0 
Mr. Pace i s n e r e w: 
de f endan t i s a l s o o r e s e n z 
.ne p i a m t i i i , 
c o u n s e l Mr. Mc?hee , 
and t h i s m a t t e r was s e t f o r p r e - t r i a l . C o u n s e l h a s 
v i s i t e d r e s t e c t i v e i v w i t h t h e C o u r t and t h e i r c l i e n t 
c..*_ -L • ^ ii. v * . i u t -











•-* s c oeen a ""s ^ oiu" icr 
v,o t > 
wnat vour unters* r* * "-*• c o * ne resolution is 
MR. PACE: Mr. Lietz will return to Myra 
Margis all the binso ecruioment taken from the 
Carousel Club, as well as any other personal property 
of anv -- either Mrs. Margis or any of the people who 
were there, the patrons of the Carousel. Mr. Lietz 
will oav to Mrs. Marais the sum of S750. Mr. Lietz 
w 11. make no claim on the automobiles that secure 
1 Mrs. M a r g i s ' d e b i t o h im. 3 o : h p a r t i e s w i l l s i g n t h e 
2 mutual r e l e a s e of a l l c l a i m s a g a i n s t e i t h e r p a r t y , 
3 and t h e r e w i l l be t h e m u t u a l r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r i n 
e f f e c t be tween t h e " o a r t i e s . Both o a r t i e s s h a l l have 
7 
3 
no contact, narassmcs, or any c< w _
 u n c . i - u n ~ n r n *» >~ 
o a r t v e x c e o t t h r o u g h t h e i r l e c a l c o u n s e l ^ -n ^ T 
b e l i e v e t h a t ' s i t . 
M *D Vf j. n a d d i t i o n — one a d d i t i o n a l 
r-, r*> A r» <-> r j > -— r r ' ^ » . 
10 W "* *~ ^ "*" ° c "~*• ~ ~* ~~ *" ^ —> -^ ' 
V v 
n t s "ocss e s s t o n 2. r 
i / -
v i n • ^ o c c r r s c c : ^ r^  -
v: 
a r s e n a l r> r o o e r t v rie n a s t n e i i n r o 
1 3 e c u i t m e n t c i r . co m a c h i n e s , . -5 -v ^, —. T*I *• r* **^  -** "*v ^. ^ ***. — Q • c - . «— ^  / i i i . 'w - J ^ . : - w . : - D / 
L7 Moreove r , v o u r Honor , t> a v m e n t and 
w . . . V S . V 
.9 
:0 
time convenient to olaintiff, and- certainlv within 14 
nd pavment of the S750 within like oeriod of 
Mr. Pace vour client a*coea^ "s 
to have a concern. Is there anything else that needs 
to be clarified? 
MR. PACE: Yeah. There were a number o: 
patrons of the Carousel Club that left a personal 
amount: of personal belonging there, and those 
belongings were gone when Mr. Lietz got in back wiuh 
the equipment. 
THE COURT: What sorts of items are we 
talking about? 
:HE PLAINTIFF: Peoole leave 





.nat Del oners to otner oecoie > a s .uc i n o • al CL 5> .--. j. .
]acKe:s, Dingo sags f u n o: Dumpers 
they use for the bingo game, and 
r* r~, ~z *-* »U;t:.J.w £ .iU 
TrIS COURT: All richt . So to the extent 
ems exist, tney are to oe r 
w i t n m tne ±4-cav oerioc cz time 
e t u r n e o 
•'"
 !
 * a r i v entities, to an exo-ianatio n zr.rouc, r« "^'T ri c; ^  "^  
o: wnat occurrea to tnose items 
,;.a: we can GO setter tnan 
existence and in the defendant's Dossessi' 
don't know 
i,;:cv CL _ *s 
to be restored 
You're going to have your hands full, 
Mr. Lietz, not from Mrs. Margis, but from the othe: 
individuals, if they're not returned, 
being — don't, please don't point. 
%
nese items 
What: I would ask is that you give some 
thought to this matter and, as Mr. McPhee pointed 
out, you have a restoration period of 14 days, and 
what is required is you are to turn over everything 
that is encompassed in the agreement. 
All right. Does thai satisfv your client's 
concerns Mr. Pace? 
Mt> t L r v 







MR. MCPHEE: Your Honor, i f I may i n d i c a t e 
l i e : : handed me a r e c e i p t , i n d e m n i t y a g r e e m e n t 
! u t e d bv a M i l l i e Hunt s t a t i n c t h a t she had 
. *v- r* ra ,-s ^ r *! 2 '' n ss -n *^  -5 c: *- s V -' r> T r*\ £\ c c; a <5 5 •* /-*• "^  O "^  *" V7 O 
c u p c a k e p a n s , two o i g p o t s , anc one ccor . i e s n e e r 
v o u l u . : - O i . 
. e individuals 
I D 
Mr. Li etc may have had. 
T V V r^Oli-' items 
10 
> 1 
understand that she's attempting to make sure people 
who have claims to property that would have b^en on 
the premises, have that restored to them. Obviously, 
if somebody has gotten back their items, then, that's 
something that she is not going to pursue, or the 
others are not going to pursue. 
Now, Mrs . M a r g i s , i s t h i s y o u r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e a g r e e m e n t ? Do you a g r e e t o be 
bound bv i t ? And I am r e f e r 
Mr. Pace has s a i d w i t h t 
m g t o e v e r y t h i n g 
le m o d i f i c a t i o n s u g g e s t e d bv 
>/ **- M r ^ n s a 
I'm not getting bad 
stun ne :OCK, I guess, DU. 
THE COUR' i nave no way of knowing 
but vou have excellent representation and what you 
10 neec to co is decide whether or not you want to go to 
i 1 
i J> 
.appens at.,tne end or tne trial, or wnetner you want 
tc accent it. No one is forcinc vou t-; 
s uo to vou, ou" it vou a cc e vou will be 
• D 
- O will not 
• 7 on o r n e- -ic- ^o tnat ' s uo to Do 
vou need time to think about it? Or is this vour 
1 C anc go vou aaree to oe. oounc c -; *- ^ 
20 'HE PLAINTIFF: I g u e s s I ' m w i l l i n g t o t r y 
r> -! HE COURT: i s "His v our agre 
o ? 'HE PLAINTIFF 
23 ** «!0 "3 • * * J •'-•" " * * i i • • • • i • ' j 
9 A - - O 




THE COURT: Mr. Lietz, is this your 
aareement and do vcu aaree to be bound bv it? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
"dZ COURT: I'm sorrv? 
THE DEFENDANT: I CO. 
THE COURT: I will, allow vcu, then, 
Mr. ? = c 6 , to o r e o a r e " hr documents cor.csrninQ 
dismissal. 
10 'HE COURT: Thank vou to both of you 
MR. MC?:-:ES JL mav a c a i n w i t n D S H S I I ' 
1 9 
"1 A 
o i : : .£ r e c c r a , I w i l l o e o u : o : : cwi i o e t w e e n m e l o t ; 
and 2 8 t h . T h i s w i l l b e d u e on t h e 2 3 t h . I h a v e no 
c r o b l e m w i t h Mr. P a c e c o n t a c t i n g Mr. l i e t c d i r e c t l v 
-i ~ ^ • ~ T/ — 
- Mr -? =1 /-» 2 . 
— w — jdv ui^;.~ anci G * i i v s . v' 
T/ — 
'HE COURT: Now, a clear understanding, 
that vou mav contact Mr. Pace oursuant to 
v/hct Mr. v r» 3 *»-\ s. ^ . *—, ^ s r e o r e s e n t e - — n ^ * 
•p •«-. n * • 
u : : a t : any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t o 
d i r e c t l y . A l l r i g h t ? 
THE DEFENDANT: Y< 
w o n u s. c u 
:HE COUR* is tnere anvtmng turtner 
this time? 












THE COURT: That takes care of u . Thank 
you. The best of luck everybody. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: Let me indicate for the record 
that Mr. McPh.ee has represented he has no problem 
with Mr. Pace tendering the order without 
Mr. McPhee's 'written approval as to form and content 
And I know Mr. Pace to be — both counsel to be 
excellent attomevs with hich ethical s * andard , and 
;o we w i l l r e l y on t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and Mr. P a c e ' s 
: r o r e s s i o n a l i S u i i 
T/P ;irr . n at.^ v o u v^ •"* "** - *•*no*** 
MR.. MCPrZEE hank you, your Hon: 
• x c u s e d ? 
,r.i L U w r i . _ 'Z ^ . w w> w v— ZL — _ \J 
Mav we 
I vou 
(Proceedings m t 









C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Kathleen Sehultz, an Official Court 
Reporter for the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that I reported the above - entitled matter on 
June 14, 1955, and that the preceding pages 1 through 
9, inclusive, comprise a true and correct Reporter's 
Transcriot of Proceedincs. 
Dated this 27th day of Seoterr.ber, 1399 
rk
iatnj.een Senuitt C . 3 . R . 
Official Court Reoortsr 
Jerold D. McPhee (3662) 
Anomey for the Defendant 
320 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2537 
Telephone: 801.322.1616 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 






Case Number: 940905177 CV 
Judse: Leslie A. Lewis 
MOTION TO QUASH AND RECALL WRIT OF GARNISHMENT 
Comes now the Defendant, Bert Lietz, who, by and through his attorney of record, Jerold D. 
McPhee, hereby moves this Court for its order quashing and recalling the Writ of Garnishment, 
which was inappropriately applied for by the Plaintiff and erroneously issued by this Court on 26 
June 2001. 
In support there of the Defendant shows this Court that this matter was dismissed with 
prejudice on March 14,2001 effective June 14,1996. The attached Memorandum of Points is herein 





Dated this C> day of July 2001. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Jefold D. McPhee 
Xitomev for the Defendant 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herebv certifv that a true and correct cocv of the fore2oins MOTION TO QUASH AND 
RECALL WRIT OF GARNISHMENT was mailed, first class postage thereon prepaid, this S "~ 
day of July, 2001. to: 
Nathan D. Pace and David Pace 
136 South Main Street, Suite 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA MARGIS, 
V S . 
•aTPfT1 T,T"-"T"7 
P l a i n t i f f , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
NOTICE OF 
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
C a s e N o : 9 4 0 9 0 5 1 7 7 CV 
J u d g e : LESLIE LEWIS 
D a r e : May 1 3 , 1 9 S 3 
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE i s s c h e d u l e d . 
D a t e : 0 3 / 1 4 / 1 9 9 3 
T i m e : 0 4 : 0 0 p . n . 
Location: Fourth Floor - N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATS 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS 
HEARING AND ARE TO 3E PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND 
ISSUES IN CONFLICT. IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE 
WILL BE SCHEDULED. 
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO OPPOSING FARTIE3, AS MAY SEEM JUST IN THE CASE. 
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY "TO SETTLE TEE LAWSUIT MUST 
BE PRESENT. 




Case No: 940905177 
Date: May 13, 1998 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case S40905177 by the method and on the data 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Kail JERCLD D. MCPEIS 
336 SOUTH 3 00 EAST SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, DT 841112504 
Mail NATHAN D. PACE 
13 6 SOUTH MAIN 
SUITE 4 04 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000 
Dated this -Q\ dav of i/^v \ r\ • i 
U 
, 19 QA£ . 
^^nn tl 
Deputy Court Cleric 
In compliance wirh the Americans with D i s a b i l i t i e s Actf individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxi l iary communicative 
aids and services) during t h i s proceeding should ca l l Third 
Dis t r ic t Court at 801-238-7391 a t l e a s t th ree working days pr ior ro 
the proceeding. 
P^rrza n / T •»- * -
1
 • • • r* r»! • ^ « 
CO MM ^ , 
NATHAN D. PACE, (6626) 
136 SOUTH, MAIN STREET SUITE ^04 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (301) 355-9700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 





MOTION FOR CONTEMPT 
AND TO STRIKE ANSWER 
AND ENTER JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9409C51T7CV 
Judse: Leslie Lewis 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through her attorney Nathan D. Pace, and hereby moves 
the Court for an Order holding the Defendant in Contempt for failing to comply with the 
previously entered settlement stipulation before the Court, and if the Defendant fails to appear at 
the August 14, 1998 pretrial conference and otherwise comply with the Court order of holding 
meaningful settlement discussions prior to that Conference, that the Court should Strike 
defendant's answer and enter a default judgment on behalf of the plaintiff in this case. 
Plaintiff requests this motion be heard and argued by parties before the Court at the 
Pretrial scheduled for August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm. 
1 
The Panies previously came before the Court and prior to trial entered into and agreed to 
a stipulated settlement which was placed on the record by the Court and approved by the Court. 
Among ihe terms and as part of that stipulation, the Defendant was required to deliver the sum 
of S900.00 to the plaintiff and make an accounting of the items taken from the Plaintiff. The 
panies met at an appointed time to deliver the items to the Plaintiff and the delivered items were 
inventoried by Counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant handed counsel for Plaintiff a check for S900.00 
at that time. Counsel for Plaintiff requested that Defendant initial the inventory list when the 
delivery was completed, Defendant refused. When counsel again requested that he initial the 
inventory list, Defendant ripped the S900.00 check from counsel for Plaintiffs hand, and drove 
away in his truck, nearly running over Plaintiff. 
Several times during the ensuing months, Counsel for Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendant 
would discuss this matter. Counsel for Defendant would state mat he was having a hard time 
communicating with his client, but that he would get him to redeliver the check as previously 
agreed to. However the check has never been delivered. As such, since the Defendant has 
shown a complete unwillingness to comply with the previous and what was intended to be a final 
stipulation and order of the Coun regarding this matter, the Plaintiff moves the Coun to hold the 
Defendant in Contemot for failing to Comolv. 
Further, the Court has ordered the panies appear on August 14, 1998 at 4:00pm for a 
pretrial conference and to have held meaningful discussions as to settlement prior to that date. 
Counsel for Plaintiff believes that neither defendant nor Counsel for Defendant will attend nor will 
2 
they participate in discussions prior to the hearing. If Defendant's do not participate in good faith 
settlement discussions and if they do not attend the August 14, 1998 hearing, Plaintiff moves the 
Court to strike the Defendant's Answer in this matter and immediately enter a default judgment 
for the Plaintiff according to the terms contained in Plaintiffs complaint. 
Plaintiff should not be continually punished for Defendant's unwillingness to abide by the 
previous Order of the Court, 
Plaintiff further asks the Court to order Defendant to pay to Plaintiff an award of S2,500 
m attorneys fees in this matter which reoresent 20 hours at S 125.00 which has been a more than 
reasonable amount of hts charged in tm^maner to date by Counsel for Plaintiff 
DA i ED THIS_iL_cay ot^M 
"Nathan D. Pace CS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OPgERVTCE 
I hereby certify that on this jL-day of/ / ^ ' ' * /l998T I had a true and correct 
' c r 
copy ot the foregoing Motion sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Jerold D. Mcphee 
336 South 300 East #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
3 
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Case No: 940905177 CV 
Judge: LESLIE LEWIS 







(s) : MYRA MARGIS 
's Attorney (s): NATHAN D, !ACS 
HEARING 
Based on the' failure to appear of the defendant * and his counsel 
the.Court grants attorney fees: in the "amount of $480.00, further 
the plaintiff is''awarded-travel costs" in .the amount of $500.00." 
The defendant, is to pay the amounts before uhe case will 
proceed .'to trial or hearing.- '.-;'- ;' 
At. the next- hearing the plaintiff may appear by telephone. 
:
 The'"court orders failure-to appear, by the defendant or an attorney 
for .the defendant (Mr McPhie or" partners) will result in the 
defendant pleadings being stricken and a judgment will enter for 
the plaintiff. The next hearing is set for 8/21/98 at 4:00 pm 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to send notice by mail and by fax to 
Mr McPhie.. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 






MINUTE ENTRY RE: MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE 
Case No: S40905177 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: 10/27/2000 
Clerk: chells 
A notice to submit has been filed, pursuant to rule 4-501, code of 
Judicial Administration, in connection with the defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Judgemnt and Award of Attorneys Fees. The Court after 
having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and 
the court's file, the Court denies the motion, 
and Award of Fees remains in "Place 
he orevious Ora^ 
(JA^L Ittef 
f u d ^ e LESLIE A. LEWIS 
/ / - /£r ^O 
v* '•  Jl 
Case No: 940905177 
Date: Oct 27, 2000 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 940905177 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JEROLD D. MCPEES 
ATTORNEY DEF 
33 6 SOUTH 3 00 EAST SUITE 2 00 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT S411I2504 
Mail NATHAN D. PACE 
ATTORNEY ?LA 
13 6 S MAIN ST 
SUITE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841010000 
Dated this # \] day of fVJW 20 ^ . 
A/1 M l\ C 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Jeroid D. McPhee (3662) 
Attorney for the Defendant 
320 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-1616 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 





NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
FOR DECISION 
Case No. 940905177 CV 
Judse: Leslie A. Lewis 
The following motion(s). as provided pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501 (d) of the UTAH 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, are now at issue and ready for decision of the coun. The 
documents indicated have been filed with the court. 
1. (a) Tvpe of motion: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO -STRIKE PLAINTIFF" S 
RESPONSE 
(b) Date filed: October 15,1998 
(c) Party filing motion: DEFENDANT 
(d) Affidavit in support 
(e) XX Memorandum in support 
(f) _ _ _ Affidavit in opposition 
- 1 -
(g) Memorandum in opposition 
.(h) Memorandum in reply 
(i) Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(a) Type of motion: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
(b) Date filed: November 24. 2000 
(c) Part}'filing motion: DEFENDANT 
(d) Affidavit in support 
(e) Memorandum in support 
(f) Affidavit in opposition 
(g) Memorandum in opposition 
(h) Memorandum in reply 
(i) Other pieading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify-): 
(a) Type of motion: PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS 
PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES. 
(b) Date filed: December 4. 2000. 
(c) Party filing motion: PLAINTIFF 
(d) Affidavit in support 
(e) Memorandum in support 
(f) Affidavit in opposition 
g) Memorandum in opposition 
(h) Memorandum in reply 
(0 Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(a) Type of motion: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FORTHE RELEASE OF FUNDS. 
(b) Dare filed: December 4, 2000. 
© Party filing moiion: PLAINTIFF 
(d) Affidavit in support 
(e) Memorandum in support 
(f) -' Affidavit in opposition 
(g) Memorandum in opposition 
(h) Memorandum in reply 
(I) Other pieading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(a) Type of motion: DEFENDANT'S 03JECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES. 
(b) Date filed: December 8, 2000. 
© Party filing motion: DEFENDANT 
(d) Affidavit in support 
(e) Memorandum in support 
(f) Affidavit in opposition 
(g) Memorandum in opposition 
- J -
6. 
(h) Memorandum in reply 
(i) Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(i) 
(a) Type of motion: DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR THE RELEASE OF FUNDS. 
(b) Date filed: December 11, 2000. 
(c) •' Party filing motion: PLAINTIFF 
(d) Affidavit in support 
(e) Memorandum in support 
(f) Affidavit in opposition 
(g) ' Memorandum in opposition 
(h) Memorandum in reply 
Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR 
DECISION was mailed, first class postage thereon prepaid, this y-rz/dav of February, 2001, to: 
• Nathan D. Pace and David Pace 
136 South Main Street, Suite 404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ti^:o/?~jQ> 
- 5 -
i t - U . ; j 
\n~ 
JEROLD D. MCPHEE #3662 
320 SOUTH 300 EAST, SUITE #200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2537 
(801)322-1616 
01 
- I Til I;: 07 






} CASE NUMBER: 940905177CV 
} 
} APPLLEANT COURT NO.: 
} 
CERTIFICATE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS NOT REQUIRED 
Appellant, Bert Lietz, by and through counsel, Jerold d. McPhee, certifies to the 
court that no transcript will be requested in the above-entitled action. The court file has 
the transcript, which will be used in this matter. It was prepared on 14 June 1996, and 
was filed the court on 28 August 1999. We will rely on any other transcript, which is 
contained in the court record. 




D. McPh^  
Attorney for the Defendant and Appellant 
Page2 
Certificate that Transcript is not Required 
District Court Case Number: 940905177CV 
Appellant Court Number: 
Plaintiff/Appellee: Myra Margis 
Defendant/Appellant: Bert Lietz 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I certify that on this ) day of £^^(T , 2001, I 
personally placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing in a sealed envelope. I further 
certify that I placed the same in the United States Postal System, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to the following: 
Nathan and David Pace 
136 South Main Street, Suite #404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
